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ABSTRACT
I examine the asset pricing implications of technological innovations that allow capital to displace
labor: automation. I develop a theory in which firms with high share of displaceable labor are neg-
atively exposed to such technology shocks. In the model, firms optimally adopt technology to gain
competitive advantage in the product market. Although automation increases an individual firm’s
competitive advantage, in equilibrium competition erodes profits and decreases firm value. Empiri-
cally, I develop a firm-level measure of displaceable labor share, based on detailed job classifications
from the O*NET database, and find that firms with high displaceable labor share have negative
exposure to technology shocks. A long-short portfolio sorted on this new measure is highly corre-
lated with existing macroeconomic measures of technology shocks. Firms with negative exposure to
these technology shocks earn a 4% per year return premium. The premium is positively predicted
by decreases in the cost of capital goods. At the firm level, I confirm that a large negative exposure
to technology shocks predicts lower employment and profitability following technology shocks, and
these effects are amplified by higher within-industry competition.
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Technological advances over the last four decades have led to adoption of many new technologies.1
An important subset of these innovations, including for example robots and software, focus on
automation that displaces human labor in favor of machine capital (see, e.g, Acemoglu and Restrepo
(2017) and Autor, Levy, and Murnane (2003)). The massive adoption of such technologies by
businesses, the associated large-scale displacement of routine-task labor, and the resulting society-
wide impacts have been termed ‘’The Second Machine Age” (Brynjolfsson and McAfee, 2014).
The importance of this wave of automation for the economy naturally raises the question of how
automation has affected, and continues to affect, asset prices.
In this paper, I study whether firms’ share of displaceable labor that can be automated by
capital affects firms’ value and their exposure to technology shocks. The amount of routine tasks
which can be automated varies across occupations and thereby across industries.2 I find that
firms with high share of displaceable labor have more negative exposure to technology shocks that
facilitate automation. I demonstrate that a long-short portfolio of firms sorted on their share of
displaceable labor replicates the dynamics of price changes in capital goods, thus creating a strong
connection between a macroeconomic variable and the dynamics of stock returns. I further show
that firms with a negative exposure to technology shocks earn an average return premium of 4%
per year. The premium varies over time, being high in periods of strong technological progress, and
is positively predicted by decreases in prices of capital goods. These properties of the premium are
consistent with a compensation for households’ time-varying job displacement risk.
To understand these findings, I develop a general equilibrium model of optimal technology
adoption with heterogeneous firms that compete in product markets, and heterogeneous households
that experience uninsurable idiosyncratic labor income shocks. In the model, all firms within a given
industry have the same opportunity to adopt a technology. I show that a technology shock that
facilitates automation decreases profits and market value of firms that can replace labor by capital.
Although additional economic mechanism such as market entry, operating leverage or inability of
firms to adopt new technology can deliver a similar result, this model points out that only a realistic
assumption of product market competition is necessary to obtain this result. The model further
highlights that the price of technology shocks depends on households’ idiosyncratic labor income
when some of the households are replaced by capital.
In the model, a technology shock embodied in capital allows firms to use cheaper capital-
based, instead of labor-based, production. Automation, which creates an optimal displacement
of labor by capital, leads to a lower production cost but entails technology adoption cost. In
a competitive environment, a firm’s profit depends on its product price relative to the product
prices of its competitors. As all firms in a given industry have the same share of displaceable
labor, a symmetric Nash equilibrium of optimal automation exists. Because automation lowers a
firm’s product price relative to its competitors and increases its revenues, upon the occurrence of
a technology shock each firm in the industry has an incentive to automate despite the technology
1See, e.g., Jovanovic and Rousseau (2005).
2See Autor and Dorn (2013). This paper provides similar results.
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adoption cost. These benefits deteriorate as the number of automated firms in the industry increases
and lower product prices become the industry-wide standard. As a consequence, automation does
not provide an advantage but is rather a costly necessity to stay competitive. I show that in
equilibrium, technology shocks lead to lower firms’ profits. Firms with a displaceable labor share
have negative exposure to such technology shocks.
An appealing feature of the model is its flexibility to generate both positive and negative
price of technology shocks. The sign of the price of risk depends on the dispersion of individual
workers’ future labor productivity. Technology shocks create risk for households. The adoption of
capital-based production reallocates workers from old to new occupations. Although on average
all workers will be more productive in their new occupations, individual workers experience either
increase or decrease in their productivity. This labor productivity shocks are purely idiosyncratic
and realized only once the worker moves to the new occupation. Since the occurrence of these
idiosyncratic shocks is triggered by the aggregate technology shocks and markets are incomplete,
the idiosyncratic risk affects the premium of the aggregate technology shock. If the dispersion of the
individual labor productivity shocks is low, households do not fear technology shocks that facilitate
automation and the technology shocks generate good states for households. If the dispersion of
individual workers’ productivity increases, households dislike technology shocks as some of them
may lose parts of their labor income. This result highlights the importance of imperfect risk sharing
as described in Constantinides and Duffie (1996) and its relationship to technological progress as
described in Kogan, Papanikolaou, and Stoffman (2017), and Gaˆrleanu and Panageas (2017).
Empirically, I measure a firm’s share of displaceable labor by a ratio of labor that can be
easily substituted by capital and the firm’s current capital stock. To construct this measure, I
classify employees’ occupations by the routine intensity of their tasks using a comprehensive set of
occupational characteristics from the O*NET database and merge the occupational level data with
firm data for employment and capital stock from Compustat.3 I find that the share of displaceable
labor is predominantly an industry-level characteristic. The variation between industries explains
70% of the total cross-sectional variation in the share of displaceable labor.
I use changes in quality-adjusted relative prices of capital goods as an empirical measure of tech-
nology shocks.4 The theoretical foundation of this measure has been shown in previous literature
(e.g., Cummins and Violante (2002); Hornstein and Krusell (1996)) and is based on the idea that
improvements in the production of capital goods such as machines and software are reflected in
lower prices of these goods adjusted for changes in quality. I empirically verify this assumption us-
ing data from the NBER-CES Manufacturing Industries database and the Input-Output Accounts
from the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA).5 Decreases in quality-adjusted prices of capital
3O*NET database is currently the primary source of occupational information in the U.S. It provides a compre-
hensive and updated set of occupational characteristics such as required skills and abilities or importance of various
activities and tasks. O*NET database is administered by the U.S. Department of Labor/Employment and Training
Administration through the O*NET Resource Center. The predecessor of the O*NET database is the Dictionary of
Occupational Titles whose data are incorporated in the first releases of the O*NET database.
4See Greenwood, Hercowitz, and Krusell (1997, 2000); Fisher (2006).
5NBER-CES Manufacturing Industries database from Becker, Gray, and Marvakov (2013) provides data on pro-
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goods are indeed associated with improvements in industries producing capital goods.
I first show that portfolios of firms sorted on their share of displaceable labor have large differ-
ences in their exposure to technology shocks. Firms with the highest share of displaceable labor
have strongly negative exposure to technology shocks. The magnitude of the exposure decreases
monotonically across the portfolios toward firms with low share of displaceable labor. A long-short
portfolio based on this measure successfully approximates the time-series of technology shocks with
a correlation of 0.6 and a strong overlap in all periods of large technology shocks. This result is
present among both manufacturing and non-manufacturing firms. I show that the differences in
the risk exposure to technology shocks are also not driven by firms’ differential exposure to other
risk factors.
Second, I investigate whether firms’ risk exposure to technology shocks earns a return premium
in the cross section of stocks. I first show that technology shocks measured by the changes in
quality adjusted relative prices of capital are a state variable indicating the risk of labor income for
households. Assets that co-move with this state variable are expected to earn a premium. I find
that firms with strongly negative exposure earn a return premium of 4% per year. The average
returns monotonically decrease across portfolios toward firms with weak risk exposure. Firms’ size
or growth opportunities might be related to firms’ share of displaceable labor and correlate with
the stock returns in the cross section. I first show that the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM)
and the size (SMB) and value (HML) factors do not explain the return premium. I next show that
standard cross-sectional return predictors do not explain the return premium in firm-level panel
regressions. I use conditional double sorts and show that the premium is also not driven by these
return predictors in a non-linear way.
Third, I investigate the time variation and predictability of the return premium. If the estimated
return premium is associated with labor income risk, it will follow a similar pattern over time.
The labor income risk is high in states of high technology shocks when the prices of capital goods
decrease. I find that the return premium is predictable by the changes in the prices of capital goods.
Periods of positive technology shocks, which decrease the prices of capital goods, are associated
with high return premium. In a companion paper (Knesl, 2018), I show that decreases in the prices
of capital goods increase households’ labor income risk and job displacement risk as cheaper and
more productive capital substitutes for human labor. This evidence further rationalizes the return
premium as a compensation of labor income risk.
Last, I examine whether firms with different exposure to technology shocks differ also in their
behavior upon the occurrence of technology shock. Firm’s differential behavior and financial per-
formance following technology shocks provide a valuable indication for the underlying economic
mechanism. I find that when the relative prices of capital goods decrease, firms with strongly
negative exposure decrease employment and increase capital more than firms with weak exposure.
These firms also experience large decrease in sales, return on capital and return on equity. This ev-
ductivity and other variables at a detailed industry level. The Input-Output Accounts from the BEA provide MAKE
and USE tables that allow to categorize industries into industries producing capital and consumption goods.
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idence directly supports the conjecture that firms’ risk exposure to technology shocks reflects firms’
financial underperformance associated with changes in production technology following a technol-
ogy shock. I document that these effects are stronger for firms in highly competitive industries, a
finding that underlines the importance of product market competition.
In this paper, I contribute to two streams of literature. First, a recent literature has focused
on the implications of technology shocks embodied in capital for firms’ growth opportunities (e.g.,
Papanikolaou (2011); Kogan and Papanikolaou (2014); Kogan et al. (2017)), the pricing of cross-
sectional return anomalies (e.g., Kogan and Papanikolaou (2013); Garlappi and Song (2016)), and
the relationship with market power (Garlappi and Song, 2017). While the general focus of these
studies is on technological advances that increase the productivity of capital with limited effects
on labor, I examine technology shocks where capital replaces labor. I show that these technology
shocks are important for firms’ adoption of labor-replacing technologies and drive households’ job
displacement risk.6 A useful benefit of my approach is the construction of a zero-cost portfolio
based on firms’ displaceable labor share that highly correlates with a macroeconomic measure of
technology shocks.
Second, I contribute to literature on the asset pricing when markets are incomplete, specifically
by the inability to insure households’ job displacement and labor income risk. The asset pricing
implications of uninsurable idiosyncratic labor income or consumption risk on asset prices have
been addressed in several earlier studies (e.g., Constantinides and Duffie (1996); Constantinides
and Ghosh (2017); Schmidt (2016)). Recent papers examine the effects of technological growth in
the presence of imperfect risk sharing (e.g., Gaˆrleanu, Kogan, and Panageas (2012); Gaˆrleanu and
Panageas (2017)). Using overlapping generations models, these papers show that although innova-
tions can especially benefit new generations of agents, innovations have an important displacement
effect if the benefits and risk cannot be shared within or across generations of agents. I adopt this
attractive feature of technological innovation creating displacement risk, but I directly model job
displacement as arising from capital displacing human workers in their occupations. Empirically, I
show that the time-varying and predictable return premium of technology shocks that facilitate au-
tomation is consistent with time-varying job displacement risk that is driven by automation. This
finding underlines the importance of state-dependent displacement risk as the singular element in
this stream of literature.
A particular aspect of my paper, the riskiness of firms with displaceable labor, has been studied
in a recent paper by Zhang (2018). He suggests that routine labor lowers firms riskiness by provid-
ing a real option hedge. In his empirical analysis, firms with a higher routine labor share relative
to industry average have lower expected returns. I arrive at a different conclusion that is supported
both by my theory and empirical evidence. The theoretical difference arises due to three main fac-
tors. First, differently from Zhang’s partial equilibrium setting that focuses exclusively on a single
firm’s riskiness, I develop a general equilibrium model to examine how the process of automation
6An important aspect of my model is technology adoption, which has been studied in different settings in e.g.,
Pa´stor and Veronesi (2009), Atkeson and Kehoe (2007), Greenwood and Jovanovic (1999), and Hobijn and Jovanovic
(2001).
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is priced on capital markets by creating risk for both firms and households. This highlights the
link between automation and job displacement risk that is important to understand the pricing of
automation on capital markets and the time-series properties of the return premium. Second, my
model includes product market competition, whose relevance is supported empirically but not con-
sidered in Zhang’s model. Third, I explicitly show that firms’ decision to displace labor by capital
is directly related to prices of capital goods. I support all these features by empirical evidence. To
reconcile the empirical differences between our papers, one has to consider that I use firms’ share
of displaceable labor relative to capital, a variable that varies primarily between industries, while
Zhang examines a firm’s deviation in routine labor share from an industry average.7 To the best my
knowledge, I am the first to show how the automation process is priced on capital markets by affect-
ing both firms and households. The key part of this is to document the strong co-movement between
changes in prices of capital goods and returns of stocks sorted by the share of displaceable labor.
This paper relates to several other streams of literature. Many of these papers study the
relationship between asset prices and different aspects of labor. Wage rigidities and operating
leverage have been addressed in Chen, Kacperczyk, and Ortiz-Molina (2011), and Favilukis and
Lin (2015, 2016). Organization capital stemming from the key talent and labor mobility have been
studied in Eisfeldt and Papanikolaou (2013) and Donangelo (2014), respectively. Labor market
frictions are examined in Belo, Lin, and Bazdresch (2014); Belo, Li, Lin, and Zhao (2017), and
Kuehn, Simutin, and Wang (2017). Other studies examine industry competition (e.g., Hou and
Robinson (2006); Loualiche et al. (2014); Corhay (2017); Bustamante and Donangelo (2017), and
Corhay, Kung, and Schmid (2017)) and offshoring (e.g., Bretscher (2017)). The potential of capital
to substitute some types of labor and complement others is at the center of many economic models
that study the effects of technological change (e.g., Acemoglu and Autor (2011); Acemoglu and
Restrepo (2018)) and more broadly (e.g., Zeira (1998); Krusell, Ohanian, R´ıos-Rull, and Violante
(2000)).
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section, I develop a general equilibrium
model of an optimal technology adoption that highlights how automation affects stock prices.
Section II provides the data sources, construction and validity of the measures of displaceable labor
share and technology shocks. I examine the exposure to technology shocks of firms with different
share of displaceable labor in section III. I describe the zero-cost portfolio that approximates the
empirical measure of technology shocks in this section. Section IV documents the cross-sectional
return premium and examines its properties including time-series predictability. This section also
shows that firms’ exposure to technology shocks is associated with differential investment and
employment policies. I conclude in section V.
7The percentage of the between-industry variation in the firms’ share of displaceable labor depends on the partic-
ular industrial classification. I show in table I that 71.7% of variation in this variable is due to the between-industry
variation when industries are defined at SIC 3-digit and NAICS 4-digit level.
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I. The Model
I develop a two-period general equilibrium model that provides a clear picture of how technology
shocks affect asset prices through stimulating labor displacement and technology adoption. The
model consists of two sectors with firms competing in monopolistic fashion and households supplying
sector specific labor. Technology shocks decrease the price of capital and motivate firms to automate
by adopting capital-based production. The model shows firms’ optimal decision to adopt the
capital-based production and its effects on the composition and risk exposure of firms within a
given sector as well as the effect on the income of households supplying labor to the sector.
A. Firms, Technology, and Automation
The economy exists for two periods. The production side of the economy consists of two sectors
s ∈ {1, 2}. Sector s = 1 initially consists of labor-based firms and sector s = 2 of capital-based
firms. Firms in sector s = 1 have an opportunity to automate by adopting capital-based production
upon the occurrence of a technology shock in the second period as described in more detail in below.
Within each sector s, there are N firms that produce firm-specific differentiated goods Yf,s,t at
time t and compete in monopolistic fashion. The number of firms is large enough so that each firm
can abstract from the consequences of its choices for the sector level aggregates. Firms produce
their goods using either a labor-based, Y lf,s,t = Lf,s,t, or a capital-based linear production function,
Y kf,s,t = Kf,s,t. A firm with capital-based production buys sector-specific capital Kf,s,t at price P
I
s,t.
I assume that firm’s capital is active and fully depreciates in the period of investment. The cash
flow of a capital-based firm is
CF kf,s,t = P
k
f,s,tY
k
f,s,t − P Is,tKf,s,t, (1)
where P kf,s,t denotes the price of firm-specific good produced in a capital-based production. A firm
with labor-based production hires sector-specific labor Lf,s,t at sector-specific wage Ws,t. Labor-
based firms have an option to automate by adopting capital-based production and paying automa-
tion cost κ. Firms will optimally do so when the price of capital investment P Is,t becomes low
enough. The cash flow of a firm with labor-based production is
CF lf,s,t = P
l
f,s,tY
l
f,s,t −Ws,tLf,s,t if not automated
CF kf,s,t = P
k
f,s,tY
k
f,s,t − P Is,tKf,s,t − κ if automated,
(2)
where P lf,s,t and P
k
f,s,t are the prices of the firm-specific good.
Sector-specific capital, Ks,t, is produced completely competitively in a linear production function
with an aggregate technology level At and sector-specific labor L
k
s,t that is employed in producing
capital:
Ks,t = AtL
k
s,t. (3)
I further assume that installation of capital is subject to decreasing returns to scale at the total
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amount of sector-specific capital as described in equation 4. The assumption of strictly decreasing
returns to scale 0 < α < 1 is important for the existence of a mixed-strategy equilibrium described
below, but not for the final implications for stock returns.8
Is,t = K
α
s,t where Is,t =
N∑
f=1
Kf,s,t (4)
Hence capital production and installation imply that individual firms face the following price of
capital:
P Is,t =
1
At
Ws,tI
1−α
α
s,t
1
α
. (5)
Equation 5 shows that an increase in technology At decreases the effective price of capital invest-
ment. This effect is partially offset by higher sector-level investment if α < 1. The technology
At and the total amount of sector-specific investment determine the marginal cost of capital-based
production relative to the marginal cost of labor-based production. Automation becomes favor-
able when the marginal cost of capital-based production decreases relative to the marginal cost of
labor-based production.
In the first period, sector s = 1 consists of firms that use labor-based production and have
the option to automate. Sector s = 2 consists entirely of firms that already use capital-based
production. The level of technology At is subject to a technology shock that is realized at the
beginning of the second period. A technology shock increases the level of technology At. Specifically,
I assume an initial level of technology ALow that can increase to AHigh with probability pH as
described in 6.
A1 = A
Low, A2 =
ALow, with probability 1− pHAHigh, with probability pH (6)
A technology shock ALow → AHigh decreases the price of capital investment P Is,2 in both sectors
s = 1, 2. The assumption of constant or decreasing prices of capital investment is supported by
the empirical evidence as the quality adjusted relative prices of capital goods experienced a secular
decrease over the last four decades (see, Fisher (2006); Cummins and Violante (2002)).9
The firm-specific goods are combined to sector-specific goods using a constant elasticity of
substitution (CES) function:
Ys,t =
 2∑
f=1
Y
ν−1
ν
f,s,t
 νν−1 , (7)
where ν is the elasticity of substitution between the firm-specific goods. I assume ν > 1 which
8The assumption of decreasing returns to scale for installation of capital at the sector level implies that individual
firms do not internalize the effect of their capital investment on the marginal cost of capital investment. It further
implies that the amount of capital used in a sector is always equal or greater than the sum of capital investments of
individual firms. This assumption is equivalent to adjustment or installation cost of capital at the sector level.
9I document an average decrease in quality adjusted relative prices of capital goods of 4 percent per year since
1960 (see, table IA.10)
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implies that the firm-specific goods are imperfect substitutes to each other. The prices of the
sector-specific goods can be expressed as
Ps,t =
 N∑
f=1
P 1−νf,s,t
 11−ν . (8)
The sector goods are combined to an aggregate final consumption good using a CES function with
a different elasticity of substitution, ρ10
YC,t =
(
2∑
s=1
Y
ρ−1
ρ
s,t
) ρ
ρ−1
. (9)
I choose the aggregate consumption goods as a numeraire by setting its price PC,t ≡ 1, and assume
that ν−1ν >
ρ−1
ρ . This assumption implies that firm-specific goods within a given sector are closer
substitutes than sector-specific goods. For example, individual products in food industry substitute
each other more readily than all food products substitute products of a different industry such as
paper mills.
Firms within each sector compete in a monopolistic fashion. Given the production type, firms
maximize dividends by setting the price of their goods:
Dlf,s,t = maxP lf,s,t
{P lf,s,tY lf,s,t −Ws,tLf,s,t} where Y lf,s,t =
(
P lf,s,t
Ps,t
)−ν
Ys,t (10)
Dkf,s,t = maxPkf,s,t
{P kf,s,tKf,s,t − P Is,tKf,s,t} where Y kf,s,t =
(
P kf,s,t
Ps,t
)−ν
Ys,t, (11)
where Y lf,s,t and Y
k
f,s,t are the demand functions for the firms’ goods. The first order conditions
of firms’ optimization in 10 and 11 imply that firms charge constant mark-ups over the marginal
production cost:
P lf,s,t =
ν
1− νWs,t and P
k
f,s,t =
ν
1− ν P
I
s,t. (12)
Upon the realization of the technology shocks at the beginning of t = 2, firms in the labor-based
sector s = 1 decide whether to automate the production. Automation changes the labor-based
production to capital-based production by incurring automation cost κ:
Df,1,2 = max{Dlf,1,2, Dkf,1,2 − κ} (13)
Automation changes the firm composition as well as the use of labor within the sector within the
sector s = 1. δ =
∑N
f=1 1{Automate=Y es}f
N denotes the percentage of firms in sector s = 1 that decide
to automate. Automation shifts labor from the direct production of firms’ goods to the production
10An equivalent aggregation can be achieved when the sector-specific goods are consumed directly by households
with CES preferences and elasticity of substitution ρ.
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of the sector-specific capital. Ll1,2 =
∑N
f=1 Lf,1,21{Automate = No}f is sector 1′s labor that is
employed directly in labor-based firms. Lk1,2 =
1
A2
(∑N
f=1Kf,1,21{Automate = Y es}f
) 1
α
is sector
1′s labor that is employed in the production of the sector-specific capital. The total amount of
labor in sector s = 1 is L1,2 = L
l
1,2 + L
k
1,2.
B. Households
There is a large number, Nh, of ex-ante identical households. Each household consists of two
spouses, each of which supplies labor effort to a different sector. Households derive utility from
consumption ch,t and disutility from labor effort Hh,1,t and Hh,2,t according to a utility function in
the spirit of Greenwood, Hercowitz, and Huffman (1988):
U (ch, Hh,1, Hh,2) = E

2∑
τ=t
βτ−t
(
ch,τ − χH
1+θ
h,1,τ
1+θ − χ
H1+θh,2,τ
1+θ
)1−γ
1− γ
 , (14)
where β is households’ subjective discount factor, χ governs the disutility of labor effort, γ is the
coefficient of risk aversion, and 1θ is the Frisch elasticity of labor supply.
Now I introduce an idiosyncratic labor productivity risk. The labor effort Hh,s,t transforms to
Lh,s,t = Hh,s,t effective hours of labor unless the spouse shifts from working directly in a labor-
based firm to working in the production of sector-specific capital. If the spouse has to move to the
production of sector-specific capital, the labor effort transforms to Lh,1,2 = (1 + ˜h)Hh,1,2 effective
hours of labor. ˜h is the spouses’ idiosyncratic random variable that determines their labor pro-
ductivity when they move to the new job. It is important to mention that the job movements are
purely intra-sectoral. When firms in sector s = 1 automate by adopting capital-based production, a
corresponding number of spouses will be displaced from these firms and employed in the production
of sector-specific capital within the same sector s = 1. The spouses cannot observe their idiosyn-
cratic labor productivity ˜h until they are employed in the new job. I specify the distribution of
the idiosyncratic labor productivity by:
˜h =
− with probability p+ with probability 1− p where  > 0. (15)
It is important to emphasize that markets are incomplete in the sense that households cannot trade
an asset that would insure them against the realization of the idiosyncratic labor productivity. This
setup is analogous to Constantinides and Duffie (1996).
To maximize their utility, each household solves following problem:
max
ch,t,Hh,1,t,Hh,2,t
U (ch,t, Hh,1,t, Hh,2,t) s.t. ch,t = Dh,t + Lh,1,tW1,t + Lh,2,tW2,t, (16)
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where Dh,t =
1
Nh
(∑N
f=1Df,1,t +
∑N
f=1Df,2,t
)
is the households capital income. The specific form
of the utility function 14 ensures that households do not take the wealth effect of the idiosyncratic
labor productivity shock ˜h into account when they decide the optimal labor supply. The first order
condition determines the optimal labor effort as:
Hh,s,t =
(
Ws,t
χ
) 1
θ
s ∈ {1, 2}. (17)
The total supply of labor to sector s at time t is Ls,t =
∑Nh
h=1 Lh,s,t. The symmetry of the distri-
bution of ˜h ensures that the labor effort of spouses working in capital production in sector s = 1
at t = 2 is transformed to effective hours on average in the same way as the labor effort of spouses
working directly in labor-based firms in the same sector, E[Lh,1,2] = E[(1 + ˜h)Hh,1,2] = Hh,1,2.
The utility optimization gives a household-specific stochastic discount factor of the form:
Λh = β
ch,2 − χH1+θh,1,21+θ − χH1+θh,2,21+θ
ch,1 − χH
1+θ
h,1,1
1+θ − χ
H1+θh,2,1
1+θ
−γ , (18)
Since all households are identical ex ante, the stochastic discount factors are identical across all
households. Each single household prices assets in the same way. At the same time, aggregate
consumption and labor efforts are not sufficient statistics for pricing firms as they omit the id-
iosyncratic component of households consumption due to the realization of the idiosyncratic labor
productivity shock.
C. Valuation
The value of firms in labor-based sector s = 1 at t = 1 is given by:
V lf,s,1 = D
l
f,s,1 + E [ΛhDf,s,2] , (19)
The value of firms in the capital-based sector s = 2 is defined equivalently as:
V kf,s,1 = D
k
f,s,1 + E
[
ΛhD
k
f,s,2
]
. (20)
The expectation operator in the valuation equations 19 and 20 is defined from household h′s
perspective over both aggregate and idiosyncratic states. The realization of all states and the
corresponding probabilities are depicted in figure 1. It is important to note that the stochastic
discount factor Λh takes a different value in each possible realization including the realization
of idiosyncratic labor productivity risk ˜h. Hence the households’ idiosyncratic risk affects the
valuation of assets. The idiosyncratic risk is relevant only when AHigh is realized. The importance
of the idiosyncratic risk is then given by the percentage of firms that automate δ∗. Hence the
idiosyncratic risk is state dependent as in Constantinides and Ghosh (2017).
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Figure 1. Households’ Possible States.
D. Equilibria
The equilibrium is defined by the solution of the households’ optimization problem 16, firms’
optimization 10, 11, and 13 and market clearing conditions on all markets. The market clearing
conditions for product markets at the level of firms and sectors as well as for capital and labor
markets are stated in appendix A.
In the second period, t = 2, there is a further condition for a Nash-type equilibrium for the
equilibrium percentage δ∗ of firms that automate within sector s = 1. Each firm must prefer its
choice of the production type given the choices of the remaining firms in the sector. There is a
unique equilibrium of one of the following three types.
Equilibrium 1. None of the firms in the sector prefers capital-based production, δ∗ = 0. The
sector remains homogeneous with labor-based firms only. In this equilibrium, inequality 21 a holds.
The left-hand side shows the payoff when the firm switches to capital-based production. This payoff
consists of dividends and an automation cost. The right-hand side is the dividend of a firm that
keeps labor-based production. If the price of capital is high enough, no firm will have an incentive
to automate as it leads to lower sales and requires automation cost κ.11
11This reasoning abstracts from the effects on the sector level variables.
12
a. νP kf,1,2
(
P kf,1,2
P1,2 (δ∗)
)−ν
Y1,2 (δ
∗)− κ ≤ νP lf,1,2
(
P lf,1,2
P1,2 (δ∗)
)−ν
Y1,2 (δ
∗) , δ∗ = 0
b. νP kf,1,2
(
P kf,1,2
P1,2 (δ∗)
)−ν
Y1,2 (δ
∗)− κ = P lf,1,2
(
P lf,1,2
P1,2 (δ∗)
)−ν
Y1,2 (δ
∗) , 0 < δ∗ < 1
c. νP kf,1,2
(
P kf,1,2
P1,2 (δ∗)
)−ν
Y1,2 (δ
∗)− κ ≥ νP lf,1,2
(
P lf,1,2
P1,2 (δ∗)
)−ν
Y1,2 (δ
∗) , δ∗ = 1,
where
d. P1,2 (δ
∗) =
(
P kf,1,2
1−ν
δ∗N + P lf,1,2
1−ν
(1− δ∗)N
) 1
1−ν
e. Y1,2 (δ
∗) =
(
Y kf,1,2
ν−1
ν δ∗N + Y lf,1,2
ν−1
ν (1− δ∗)N
) ν
ν−1
(21)
This equilibrium is shown in the first column (no shock) in figure 2. Panel A shows the market-
clearing prices of goods produced by each type of firm, labor-based and automated, as a function
of the percentage of firms that automate δ. The blue line depicts the prices of goods produced
by labor-based firms and the red line depicts the equivalent function for automated firms. I select
the model parameters so that the lines intersect at δ = 0 if the technology A2 remains constant
at ALow. The goods prices of automated firms are predominantly increasing in δ. The increase
reflects the decreasing returns to scale of the capital installation function 4.
[Place Figure 2 about here]
Panel B shows the corresponding demands for the goods of each firm type as functions of δ. The
demand for goods of labor-based firms is above the demand for goods of automated firms for δ > 0
as the prices of labor-based firms’ goods are lower in this region. This follows from the demand
functions in equations 10 and 11.
Panel C shows the dividends of each type of firm as functions of δ. The dividends of labor-based
firms are above the dividends before automation cost of automated firms for δ > 0. This follows
from the price elasticity of the demand functions for firm-specific goods −ν < −1. The dividends
of automated firms are even smaller when the automation cost κ is taken into account. Hence the
equilibrium percentage of automated firms in sector s = 1 is δ∗ = 0.
Equilibrium 2. A percentage 0 < δ∗ < 1 of firms in the sector automates and pays automation
cost. This equilibrium can be thought of as a mixed-strategy equilibrium where firms choose an
optimal probability δ∗ to automate and probability 1 − δ∗ to keep the labor-based production.
The equilibrium is defined by the equality 21 b. The left-hand side shows the payoff of a firm
that automates. The right-hand side is the dividend of a firm that keeps labor-based production.
Abstracting from the effects at the sector level, the equality holds when the gain from higher sales
due to lower goods prices
(
Pkf,1,2
P1,2(δ∗)
)−ν
exactly counterweights the automation cost κ. Firms that
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adopt capital-based production extract higher rents at the cost of firms that keep labor-based
production.
The middle column of figure 2 shows this type of equilibria. I assume an incremental improve-
ment in the technology level AHigh. In panel A, the prices of goods from automated firms shift
downward and intersect the price function of the labor-based firms. Panel B shows that the changes
in prices lead to a higher demand for goods of automated firms relative to labor-based firms if the
percentage of automated firms is low enough. Panel C shows the equilibrium percentage of firms δ∗
in sector s = 1 that optimally automate production. In the region δ < δ∗, labor-based firms have
an incentive to automate as they will benefit from higher demand. In the region δ∗ < δ < δˆ, firms
do not want to automate as the slightly higher demand for their products does not compensate the
automation cost κ. In the region δ∗ < δ, the demand for goods of automated firms is already below
the demand for goods of labor-based firms. Firms are indifferent between keeping the labor-based
production and automation only at δ∗.
Equilibrium 3. All firms in the sector automate, δ∗ = 1. The sector is homogeneous with
capital-based firms only, and inequality 21 c holds. This equilibrium arises when the price of capital
P I1,2 is low enough. In this case, a firm will experience dramatically lower sales when it keeps the
labor-based production given all other firms have automated. Hence all firms optimally adopt the
capital-based production despite the automation cost to avoid more severe punishment through
lower sales. Abstracting from the effects at the industry level, all firms keep the same rent but pay
the automation cost κ.
This equilibrium is shown in the right-hand side column in figure 2. I assume a large increase
in the technology level AHigh. In this case the prices of goods of automated firms are always
below the prices of labor-based firms. This is reflected in the demand function of the automated
firms that is always above the demand function of the labor-based firms. If the improvement in
the technology level A2 is large enough, the net dividend of automated firms will be above the
dividend of labor-based firms regardless of the percentage of automated firms in the sector. The
equilibrium percentage of automated firms is δ∗ = 1. Even in this case the net dividend can be
below the original level. All firms in the sector optimally decide to automate even if automation
leads to a lower net dividend. Firms which had stuck with the labor-based production would have
experienced much lower revenues that is more penalizing than the automation cost κ. This situation
highlights that adopting a relatively cheaper production technology can become a pure necessity
to stay competitive and the automation benefits are passed to the final consumers in the form of
lower product prices.
Panel A in figure 3 presents the relationship between the magnitude of the technology shock
AHigh, conditional on the occurrence of this state, and the equilibrium percentage of automated
firms δ∗. This relationship is strictly positive. A higher level of technology AHigh decreases the
prices of capital investment P I1,2 and makes capital-based production more favorable despite a higher
amount of invested capital I1,2. I select the model parameters such that the first type of equilibria,
δ∗ = 0, exists when A2 = ALow < 0.85. The second type of equilibria, 0 < δ∗ < 1 emerges when
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A2 = A
High and 0.85 < AHigh < 1.06. The third type of equilibria, δ∗ = 1 establishes if the
technological change is large enough, A2 = A
High > 1.06.
E. Implications for Firms Risk Exposure and the Dynamics of Stock Returns
In this section I show that a positive technology shock that facilitates automation can lead to an
adverse outcome for firms in a sector that is undergoing at least partial automation. The adverse
effect of such a shock is equally present among all firms within the sector regardless of whether the
particular firm automates or not.
Panel B of figure 3 shows the equilibrium dividends of firms in sector s = 1 as a function of the
magnitude of the technology shock AHigh, conditional on realization of this state. In equilibrium,
the dividends are identical for all firms in the sector regardless of whether the particular firm
automates or not. An increase in the technology shock leads to a lower dividend of every firm
in this sector. This relationship is weak for low levels of AHigh but becomes stronger for higher
values of the technology. This reflects the convex relationship between the equilibrium percentage
of automated firms δ∗ and AHigh shown in panel A.12
A larger technology shock leads to a higher percentage of firms that automate δ∗ and charge
lower product prices. This decreases the price of the sector-aggregate good P1,2 (δ
∗) as shown
in formula 21 d. Since firm’s relative revenues depend on the price of its good relative to the
sector-aggregate good
(
Pf,1,2
P1,2(δ∗)
)−ν
with ν > 1, it becomes more prohibitive to keep the labor-based
production that produces goods at higher relative prices. At the same time, the rents of automated
firms decrease as the prices of their goods and the price of the sector-aggregate good come closer
to each other. Automation becomes a costly necessity to stay competitive.13
[Place Figure 3 about here]
Panel C shows the effect of technology shocks on dividends of firms in sector s = 2. This
relationship is strictly positive. Since this sector already consists of firms with capital-based pro-
duction, firms do not undergo the costly process of automation. Hence firms in sector s = 2 benefit
directly from lower prices of capital investment P I2,2 brought by a higher level of technology.
In this model, the effect of technology shock on dividends translates directly to firms’ risk
exposure to the shock. I plot the risk exposure of firms in each sector as functions of AHigh in panel
A of figure 4. Firms in sector s = 1 have negative exposure to technology shocks. The magnitude
of the exposure is low for low values of AHigh but increases dramatically. Hence a technology shock
decreases the firm value of firms in this sector. These firms experience negative return on the
impact of technology shock. Firms in sector s = 2, which consists entirely of capital-based firms,
have positive exposure and experience positive stock return upon the occurrence of technology
shock.
12I plot the firms’ dividends as a function of the equilibrium percentage of automated firms δ∗ in online appendix
figure IA.1. This relationship becomes generally linear.
13This statement abstracts from inter-sectoral demand shifts. The inter-sectoral demand shifts are considerably
smaller as the sector-level goods are weaker substitutes.
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[Place Figure 4 about here]
The results in this section show that competition forces firms to undergo costly automation
process although its benefits are passed through to the final consumers. Firms with labor that can
be automated by capital then exhibit negative risk exposure to technology progress that facilitates
such automation.
F. Implications for Stock Return Premium
In this section, I show that the differences in firms’ exposure to technology shocks are associ-
ated with differences in expected stock returns as the risk of technology shocks is priced by the
households.
First, I emphasize that the model is able to general both negative and positive premium for the
risk of technology shock that facilitate automation. The sign of the premium is determined by the
dispersion of the idiosyncratic labor productivity shock  the households face upon the occurrence
of technology shock and the associated possible job movement. Figure 5 shows the relationship
between the dispersion of the idiosyncratic labor productivity  and the risk premium of an asset
E
[
RI
] − Rf that has β = 1 exposure to the technology shock A2. Households require a positive
premium for this asset if the idiosyncratic labor productivity risk  is low. In this case, the higher
average labor productivity of spouses working in the capital production due to AHigh dominates
the idiosyncratic labor productivity risk. As  increases the idiosyncratic labor productivity risk
dominates and the return premium becomes negative. In this case, households dislike the occurrence
of technology shock as they may experience a severe decrease in their labor income. The same asset
becomes valuable as it outperforms upon the occurrence of the technology shock.
[Place Figure 5 about here]
For the following analysis, I assume the case of negative premium. This assumption will align
with the empirical evidence in later sections. The relativity of the return premium described in
figure 5, however, highlights that the implications of technology shock for expected stock return de-
pend on the particular economic environment, in this case the households’ ability to stay productive
in new occupations.
Panel B in figure 4 shows the expected stock returns of firms in each sector as functions of the
magnitude of the technology improvement AHigh. Firms in sector s = 1 earn higher expected return
than firms in sector s = 2. This follows directly from the firms’ exposure and the assumption of
negative risk premium. Firms in sector s = 1 have a negative exposure (see panel A) to a negatively
priced risk which results in high expected returns. The positive exposure of firms in sector s = 2
to the same risk leads to lower expected returns.
The difference in the expected returns between firms in sector s = 1 and s = 2 increases with
the magnitude of AHigh as shown in panel C. This follows from the changes in the exposure of firms
in sector s = 1 as shown in panel A. The exposure of firms in sector s = 1 becomes more negative
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as AHigh increases, while the exposure of firms in sector s = 2 remains almost constant. The
increasing differences in the exposure of firms in each sector lead to similarly increasing differences
in expected return.
II. Data
A. Measuring Firms’ Share of Displaceable Labor, The Automation Potential
The main input in my analysis is a measure of firms’ share of displaceable labor, the Automation
Potential (AP). I use the occupational characteristics from the O*Net database, the composition of
labor force from Occupational Employment Statistics (OES) and the relative importance of labor
and capital to calculate the AP measure at the firm level. The AP measures the relative importance
of labor that can be easily replaced by capital.
I measure firm j′s AP at time t as:
APj,t = ln
(
Lroutinej,t
Kj,t
)
(22)
The numerator of the AP formula, Lroutinej,t measures the number of employees in routine inten-
sive occupations, i.e. labor that can potentially be substituted by capital. To assess the relative
importance of routine labor in the production process, I divide the labor by firms’ capital.14 I
carefully examine a range of alternative specifications of the AP formula and discuss them in detail
below.
I measure the potential of replacing human workers by capital in each occupation by the Routine
Task Intensity measure (RTI). This measure was originally developed by Autor and Dorn (2013)
and measures the importance of routine, abstract and manual tasks in each occupation. High RTI
scores indicate high importance of routine tasks in a given occupation. Routine tasks are defined
as tasks that can be accomplished by following a precise set of rules and potentially be executed
by machines programmed to follow this set of rules.15 Low RTI scores indicate low importance of
routine tasks and high importance of abstract and manual tasks, which cannot easily be performed
by machines.
The original measure was calculated for 330 occupations based on data from the Dictionary
of Occupational Titles (DOT) 1977. I develop a new and more detailed version of the RTI mea-
sure based on occupational characteristics from the majority of the O*NET database releases. I
describe the structure and the data collection procedure of the O*NET database in appendix B.
14The term production process is used widely in this context. It refers not only to physical production but also to
all operations of a given firm including firms in service sectors that do not necessarily produce physical products.
15Autor et al. (2003) developed the original underlying data for the RTI measure and define the routine tasks as
follows: ‘In our usage, a task is “routine” if it can be accomplished by machines following explicit programmed rules.
Many manual tasks that workers used to perform, such as monitoring the temperature of a steel finishing line or moving
a windshield into place on an assembly line, fit this description. Because these tasks require methodical repetition
of an unwavering procedure, they can be exhaustively specified with programmed instructions and performed by
machines.’
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This approach significantly improves the RTI measure in several dimensions. First, I use multiple
releases of the O*NET database, which allows the new RTI measure to capture the changes in the
occupational characteristics within occupations over time. Technological progress and automation
are likely to change the nature of some occupations over time. Autor et al. (2003) show that
occupations that increased the use of computers significantly reduced the input of routine tasks
and became more nonroutine.16 This evidence stresses the importance to account for changes in
occupational characteristics over time. Second, I calculate the RTI measure for a larger number
and more detailed occupations. Depending on the release of the O*NET database, I calculate
the RTI measure for 654-731 occupations.17 Third, I use larger set of underlying occupational
characteristics (30 instead of 5) to measure the importance of routine, abstract and manual task
inputs. The wide range of the characteristics provides a robust measurement of the importance of
each type of tasks. It allows for changes in task inputs within occupations to be easily detected
over time as some occupations may change only one characteristic while keeping others constant.
This approach also addresses a possible bias in selecting suitable characteristics to measure the
importance of tasks inputs.18
To calculate the RTI measure, I select 30 occupational descriptors and group them into descrip-
tors measuring abstract, routine and manual tasks. I report the full list of the descriptors including
the corresponding scales of measurement in online appendix table IA.3. I calculate the routine,
abstract and manual task inputs for each occupation by averaging the scores of the corresponding
descriptors as follows
T jocc,t =
1
Nj
∑
i∈Nj
Descriptorocc,t,i
j ∈ {Routine, Manual, Abstract}, (23)
where T jocc,t is the input of task j in occupation occ at time t and Nj is the set of descriptors for
j′s task input. Using the task inputs, I calculate the RTI for each occupation as
RTIocc,t = ln
(
TRocc,t
)− ln (TMocc,t)− ln (TAocc,t) (24)
Occupations with a high RTI score predominantly consist of routine tasks and hence have high
potential to be automated by machines. Occupations with a low RTI score require strong input
of abstract or manual tasks, such as critical thinking, active learning, negotiation or operating
vehicles and hence cannot easily be automated. I report the summary statistics of the RTI scores
16I find supportive evidence for changes in the RTI measure within occupations in online appendix figure IA.3.
17I report the exact number of occupations in each O*NET release for which I calculate the RTI measure in table
IA.2
18Acemoglu and Autor (2011) also construct RTI measure based on the O*NET database version 14.0. The
approach and the selection of the underlying descriptors is similar and my RTI measure strongly correlates with the
RTI measure in this paper. The main distinction is that I utilize the updates of the O*NET database as well as the
original data from the Dictionary of Occupational Titles included in the first releases of the O*NET database. This
allows me to account for the changes within occupations over time and avoid carrying over possible measurement
errors to other years.
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and the underlying task inputs at the level of occupations in online appendix table IA.4. To provide
examples of the most routine and non-routine occupations, I list representative routine and non-
routine occupations in online appendix table IA.5. These occupations are selected to represent the
typical occupations with low and high RTI scores.19 It is important to note that the routine task
intensity is not the same dimension as labor skill dimension. Routine occupations are generally
concentrated in the middle skill-level occupations with average labor income (see e.g. Autor and
Dorn (2013)).20
The AP measure can vary between industries, as well as across firms within the same industry.
The majority of the variation, however, is at the between industry level. Table I reports the
summary statistics and variance decomposition of the AP measure into within and between industry
variation. Panel A shows that there is a considerable variation in the share of displaceable labor
measured by the AP measure at the firm level across firms in all industries and the results in panel
B show that similar variation is present also when firm level observations are aggregated at the
industry level, i.e. variation between industries. Panel C then shows formally that the majority of
the variation in the AP measure is due to between industry variation, as it accounts for about 70%
of the total variance. This result indicates that the automation potential measured by the ratio of
routine labor to capital is a predominantly industry-specific characteristic.21 I list the industries
with the lowest and highest automation potential, as defined by the AP measure in online appendix
table IA.7. I establish the validity and robustness and discuss potential shortcomings of the new
RTI measure in appendix C.
[Place Table I about here]
I next establish the relationship between the AP measure and two other potential measures.
First, I use the total number of all employees instead of the total capital in the denominator of the
AP measure, i.e. Routine intensityj,t = ln
(
Lroutinej,t
Ltotalj,t
)
. Second, I use the number of all employees
instead of employees in routine occupations in the numerator. This measure is in essence a firm’s
labor intensity, i.e. Labor intensity = ln
(
Ltotalj,t
Kj,t
)
. These two measures are positively correlated
with each other. Online appendix figure IA.2 shows that the correlation is strong except for
the 1990s when the sample was inflated by a large number of new dot-com firms that lacked
typical production facilities. The strong relationship between these two measures has re-established
again since 2005.22 Due to this strong relationship, both measures sort firms and industries cross-
sectionally in a very comparable way in most of the years examined.
19Since the RTI score changes for each occupation over time, I select representative routine and non-routine
occupations with high and low RTI score, respectively, in multiple years. Full lists and detailed descriptions of the
most routine and nonroutine occupations in O*NET 98, O*NET 5.1 and O*NET 20.1 are in online appendix.
20Another interesting fact shown in Abis (2017) is the ongoing pervasion of computing technology and algorithmic
trading relative to discretionary human-based trading in fund management industry.
21Although the majority of the variation in AP is at the industry level, there are still firms within the same industry
that differ from the industry peers. The within industry variation in share of routine labor relative to industry peers
has been studied by Zhang (2018).
22The pattern is robust to the use of RTI measures based on each O*NET or DOT data.
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I also examine the importance of different types of capital in the denominator of the AP measure.
Specifically, I use only equipment or equipment and intellectual products and property instead of a
firm’s total capital to address a potential concern that the total capital of some firms is dominated
by structures. I also account for the changes in the composition of equipment over time on the basis
of the real stock of 64 different types of equipment.23 This addresses the potential concern that
some industries significantly increased the real stock of equipment, such as ICT equipment, whose
nominal prices decreased over time and hence the increase in real stock would not be reflected in
firm’s total nominal capital. None of these variations are essential for the subsequent analysis. The
results in the following sections are robust to the use of these alternative AP measures and results
based on alternative specifications of AP measure are available upon request.
B. Financial Data
I focus on common stocks of firms listed on NYSE, NASDAQ, and AMEX from 1970 to 2015
and use monthly data from the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP). To calculate the
AP measure, I require the firms to have underlying data for the number of employees and total
net capital in the Standard and Poor’s Compustat database. I exclude financials SIC 6000-6799,
utilities SIC 4900-4999, and public sector companies SIC≥9000. Hou, Xue, and Zhang (2017) find
that the a large number of previously documented cross-sectional return anomalies are strongly
driven by micro-cap stocks and these anomalies are hardly replicable when the sample excludes
micro-cap stocks. To address this concern, I exclude small and illiquid stocks as well as stocks
with short history from my sample. I describe the applied filters in detail in appendix D. None
of these filters are essential for the documented results. The final sample contains a total of 8,150
unique firms. I also redo my analysis on the basis of S&P 500 stocks and find quantitatively and
qualitatively very similar results. The results based on the constituents of S&P 500 are presented
in online appendix.
C. Measuring Technology Shocks Embodied in Capital
I measure the technology shocks embodied in capital by the changes in quality adjusted relative
prices of investment goods. The formal theoretical validity of this measure has been derived in
previous literature, e.g. Greenwood et al. (1997); Cummins and Violante (2002); Hornstein and
Krusell (1996) (see appendix E for a parsimonious theoretical foundation based on these papers).24
The intuition behind the theoretical foundation of this measure is that investment-specific technol-
ogy shocks allow for production of new capital goods, such as machines, software or equipment,
at lower cost or higher quality. Hence the changes in the quality adjusted prices of capital goods
relative to aggregate prices are informative about the technological progress. I construct the mea-
23I use the BEA classification for the different types of equipment.
24Various versions of these measure has been successfully used in previous studies focusing on the effects of the
investment-specific technology shock on economic growth, e.g. Greenwood et al. (1997) and business cycle, e.g.
Greenwood et al. (2000); Fisher (2006)
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sure of technology shocks embodied in capital (I-shock measure) by subtracting the log changes in
the quality-adjusted prices of capital goods from the log changes in the aggregate price level. An
increase in the I-shock measure indicates a positive technology shock and is associated with higher
quality and/or lower prices of capital goods.
The underlying price indexes are from the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA). I measure
the aggregate price level by the price index of the personal consumption expenditures for nondurable
goods. The quality-adjusted prices of capital goods are based on the price index for private fixed
investment in nonresidential equipment. This price index is a combination of price indexes of 25
different types of equipment. I use annual frequency for both time-series and calculate the I-shock
measure from 1970 to 2015.
Since the I-shock measure is based on quality adjusted prices of capital goods, it is important
to account for the changes in quality of goods in the underlying price indexes. The increase in the
horsepower of cars and increases in the processing power and memory of computers over recent
decades are prominent examples of large quality changes of goods. Ideally, quality-adjusted price
indexes take the changes of quality into account and express the price per efficiency unit. Several
earlier papers, e.g. Griliches (1961); Gordon (1990), point out the lack of an appropriate quality
adjustment of the NIPA price indexes of equipment. The BEA has addressed the problem of quality
adjustment over the last three decades and developed price indexes that account for quality changes
using various techniques such as hedonic regressions.25 The price indexes of fast improving types of
equipment such as computers and peripherals have used hedonic-based quality adjustments since
the 1980s. I further account for possible quality changes by using the quality adjustment from
Cummins and Violante (2002). This adjustment accounts for the measured quality difference in
the underlying components of the price index of capital goods from Gordon (1990) until 1983 and
extrapolates the adjustment to recent years.
Consistent with previous literature, e.g. Fisher (2006), I document a positive mean of the I-shock
measure, indicating a secular trend of decreasing prices and increasing quality of capital goods. I
provide a full set of summary statistics of the I-shock measure in online appendix table IA.10.
The I-shock measure correlates strongly with the TFP shock of industries producing the capital
goods. The correlation with TFP shock of industries producing consumption goods is practically
zero. This result is in line with the theoretical foundation of this measure. The correlation with
the aggregate TFP shock is negligible. This reflects the fact that industries producing the capital
goods comprise a relatively small part of the U.S. economy. The I-shock measure has a positive
correlation with the GDP growth. This is consistent with previous papers showing that prices of
capital goods are an important driver of economic growth, Fisher (2006); Greenwood et al. (2000).
The dashed blue line in figure 6 plots the normalized time-series of the I-shock measure from
1970 to 2015.26 The most prominent and pervasive technology shock during this period was from
25Wasshausen, Moulton, et al. (2006) provide a brief overview of the use of hedonic methods by the BEA to measure
real GDP; Fox and McCully (2016) provide detailed information about the price indexes for all types of equipment
and discusses the quality adjustments employed by BEA.
26The solid red line is a factor mimicking portfolio that is describe in sections III.
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1997 to 2001. During these years, the normalized I-shock measure recorded a cumulative increase
of 5.71 standard deviations. This increase was driven mainly by a large drop in the quality-adjusted
prices of information processing equipment. The prices of this equipment decreased by 40 percent,
while the prices of personal expenditures for nondurables increased by 8 percent. Since information
processing equipment accounted for one third of total private investment, the aggregate price index
of capital goods decreased by 15 percent. The massive drop in the prices of information process-
ing equipment can be tracked back to a significant productivity growth (TFP shock) in a single
manufacturing industry. The electronic computer manufacturing industry recorded an increase in
productivity of 216 percent. The remaining manufacturing industries, including consumption goods
producers, experienced only moderate productivity growth of 5.33 percent.27
I link all other major shocks in the I-shock measure to the differential productivity growth of
a small number of capital goods producing industries in online appendix table IA.12.28 I show in
online appendix table IA.12 that the whole time-series of the I-shock measure can be approximated
by differential productivity growth of capital producing industries. This evidence provides validity
to the theoretical foundation of the I-shock measure as an appropriate measure of technology shocks
embodied in capital goods.
D. I-shock as an Income State Variable
I show in a companion paper Knesl (2018) that technology shocks embodied in capital, measured
by the changes in relative prices of capital goods, are an important source of job displacement and
labor income risk. Lower prices and higher quality of capital goods allow substituting capital for
labor in occupations that have the potential to be automated. Hence, technology shocks embodied
in capital are an important state variable indicating the risk in labor income of households. This
result is broadly in line with other papers investigating the impact of innovation and technological
progress on labor income, e.g. Kogan et al. (2017). I provide a concise illustration of this result
below. I refer the reader to the papers mentioned above for detailed results.
Panel A of table II reports the results of regressing contemporaneous and future changes in
personal income, private fixed investment in equipment and employment on the I-shock measure
and aggregate productivity shock. Specifically, I estimate the regression of this form
1
K + 1
K∑
k=0
yt+k − yt+k−1 = α+ γIshock × Ishockt + γTFP × TFPt + t+k, (25)
where yt is the log level of nominal personal income, private fixed investment, or total nonfarm
employees.29 Ishockt is the I-shock measure representing the change from t−1 to t. The TFPt is the
27The calculations are based on the data from the NBER-CES Manufacturing Industries database Bartlesman and
Gray (1996) and the Input-Output Accounts data from the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis
28See also Greenwood and Yorukoglu (1997) for a detailed discussion of the positive technology shock in 1974.
29I use nominal personal income to avoid a potential mechanical effect of deflating as the I-shock measure contains
changes in prices of consumption goods in its numerator. The estimation results based on nominal personal income
represent lower bound.
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change in the aggregate productivity over the same time period. I estimate the regression at annual
frequency from 1970 to 2015 for time horizons K = 0, 1, and 2. The results are robust to controlling
for lagged dependent variable and alternative specifications. The first three columns show that a
positive technology shock embodied in capital (I-shock) is associated with an immediate increase
in investment in equipment that fades away in the subsequent years. The estimates in columns
(4)-(6) indicate that the I-shock leads to a significantly lower employment in the first and second
year after the shock. The last three columns then show that a positive I-shock is also associated
with lower personal income growth.
[Place Table II about here]
Looking only at the aggregate average income growth can hide potentially important effect of
technology shocks on individual personal income growth. To examine the effect of the I-shock
on higher moments of cross-sectional distribution of individual income, I estimate the regression
equation 25 with changes in the first three central moments of the cross-sectional distribution of
individual income growth as the dependent variable using the data from Guvenen, Ozkan, and Song
(2014).30 Panel B of table II presents the estimates. The first three columns verify that the I-shock
has a negative effect on the average income growth as documented in panel A. Columns (4)-(6)
show the standard deviation increases only slightly following a positive I-shock. The last three
columns show that a decrease in prices of capital goods, a positive technology shock, has the most
negative effect on the skewness of individual income growth. A positive technology shock embodied
in capital significantly increases the left skewness of the income growth distribution. Individuals
are more likely to experience large drops in personal income in years following a positive I-shock.
This result is in line with Knesl (2018) in showing that a positive I-shock increases the prob-
ability of losing job. Large negative idiosyncratic shocks to income growth such as job loss are
then pronounced in higher moments of income growth distribution as shown above. This sup-
port the assumption of the state dependent idiosyncratic labor productivity risk in the theoretical
model presented earlier. Higher moments of the cross-sectional distribution of individual income
growth play a central role in pricing assets in incomplete markets when agents face uninsurable
income risk. Constantinides and Duffie (1996) derive a theoretical model of incomplete markets
with heterogeneous agents and uninsurable idiosyncratic income risk where the second moment
of the cross-sectional distribution of individual labor income enters the stochastic discount factor.
Constantinides and Ghosh (2017) show that the third central moment of individual income growth
drives asset prices and risk-free rate.31 Schmidt (2016) provides evidence that the idiosyncratic tail
risk of income growth is state-dependent and predicts stock returns, and further shows that a model
with state-dependent, time-varying idiosyncratic disaster risk and incomplete markets matches the
30Estimating the regression equation (25) with levels of the central moments as dependent variables provides similar
results. The results are similar when I control for lagged dependent variable.
31The theoretical model in Constantinides and Ghosh (2017) assumes that households consumption equals house-
holds labor plus dividend income, where the labor income is subject to uninsurable idiosyncratic shock. The model
is estimated using individual consumption data from the Consumer Expenditure Survey
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key asset pricing moments.
III. Technology Shocks and Displaceable Labor
A. Co-movement
I sort stocks into five portfolios based on their share of displaceable labor (AP) to examine
the time-series and cross-sectional properties of stock returns associated with firms’ automation
potential. I report the summary statistics of firm characteristics in each portfolio in online appendix
table IA.15. The first portfolio consists of stocks with the highest AP. These firms also have high
average labor intensity and a high percentage of employees in routine occupations. The average AP
measure then decreases from -2.9 in the first portfolio to -5.9 in the fifth portfolio. The portfolios
are rebalanced annually at the end of June and portfolio returns are value-weighted unless stated
otherwise.
[Place Figure 6 about here]
Figure 6 plots the I-shock measure and the annual stock return difference between firms with
low and high displaceable labor share, i.e. long-short portfolio with a long position in the bottom
quintile of firms ranked by the AP measure and a short-position in the top quintile, the KML
portfolio. These two time-series co-move very strongly and overlap in all spikes. The correlation
coefficient is 0.60. This strong co-movement is a robust feature of the data and it is present across
various samples of firms. It holds when I exclude firms producing capital goods from the sample
and it is present independently among both, manufacturing and non-manufacturing firms. The
co-movement is also not driven by firms’ operating leverage or size (see figure IA.4 and table
IA.22 in the online appendix for the long-short portfolio consisting of firms in these samples as
well as portfolios controlling for operating leverage and size). This results indicates a very strong
connection between macroeconomic variable measuring changes in capital goods prices and the
dynamics of stock returns.
I first examine whether the co-movement of the KML portfolio with the I-shock measure is
driven by ranking individual firms relative to industry peers or by ranking whole industries across
the economy. Table III reports the correlation coefficients between the I-shock measure and the
long-short portfolios based on the within- and between-industry variation in displaceable labor
share, AP. The correlation is strong, 0.53-0.59, for long-short portfolios based on ranking whole
industries. It is weak for long-short portfolios of firms ranked relative to industry peers. This is
in agreement with the dominance of the between-industry variation in the AP measure discussed
above (see panel C in table I). Both pieces of evidence underline the role of displaceable labor share
as an industry characteristic.
[Place Table III about here]
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I next examine how the exposure to technology shocks varies across the five portfolios. Panel
A of table IV reports the results from regressing annual portfolio returns on a constant and the I-
shock measure. The first portfolio, consisting of stocks with the highest share of displaceable labor,
has the strongest and most negative exposure to technology shocks. The estimated coefficients
are negative for all five portfolios. They increase monotonically across all portfolios from -3.4 for
the first portfolio to -1.0 for the fifth portfolio. The estimated coefficients are economically large
and statistically significant for the first four portfolios. This result indicates that the strong co-
movement of the KML portfolio with the I-shock measure is generated by stocks with high share
of displaceable labor. These stocks react negatively to technology shocks. The KML portfolio, i.e.
Low-High AP, then exhibits positive and significant exposure to technology shocks of 2.3.
[Place Table IV about here]
Panel B in table IV repeats the analysis controlling for the aggregate market return. The first
portfolio has still the strongest and most negative exposure to technology shocks. The pattern
of the estimated coefficients remains monotonic across the portfolios. A notable difference is that
all coefficients of the I-shock measure are shifted up so that the fifth portfolio has a positive and
significant exposure. The coefficients of the I-shock measure across the first three portfolios remain
negative and statistically and economically significant. The KML portfolio has a positive and
significant exposure to technology shocks of same magnitude, 2.4. The major part of this exposure,
1.6, comes again from the short position in the first portfolio consisting of firms with high share of
displaceable labor.
Regressions in panel C control additionally for the size (SMB) and value (HML) factors as
defined by Fama and French (1993). The results are very similar. The estimated coefficients of
the I-shock measure increase monotonically across the portfolios from -1.4 for the first portfolio to
0.56 for the fifth portfolio. These results show that standard factors cannot explain the differential
exposure to technology shocks across portfolios containing firms with low and high displaceable
labor share. I show in online appendix table IA.14 that the results are also not driven by the
profitability and investment factors of Fama and French (2015), the return difference between
capital goods and consumption goods producers (IMC) of Papanikolaou (2011) and aggregate
economic growth.
The findings in this section document that technology shocks embodied in capital have a strong
and negative impact on firms with high share of displaceable labor. These firms are generally
labor-intensive with relatively low capital but high use of labor that can be easily automated.
Firms with low displaceable labor share usually have high capital or not easily replaceable labor
and weak exposure to technology shocks. The results on firms’ exposure presented in this section
are consistent with the predictions of the theoretical model.
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B. Firms’ Exposure to Technology Shocks
The previous section shows that the stock return differences between firms with low and high
displaceable labor share, the KML portfolio, strongly correlate with the time-series of technology
shocks, the I-shock measure. Hence, the KML portfolio is a reasonable, stock return-based measure
capturing the time-series variation of technology shocks. I use the KML portfolio to estimate firms’
exposure to technology shocks directly from the stock returns. Specifically, for each firm I estimate
the exposure to technology shock, βKMLi , from a rolling regression:
ri,t = αi + β
KML
i rKML,t + i,t, (26)
where ri,t denotes firm i
′s monthly excess return and rKML,t is the monthly return on the KML
portfolio. I estimate this regression for every stock in the sample each year at the end of June using
monthly returns over the last 60 months.32 This method allows the βKMLi vary over time. The
results reported below are robust to including market excess return and the size, and value factors
of Fama and French (1993) as control variables in regression equation 26.33
Technology shocks are a significant source of labor income and job displacement risk. The I-
shock measure is a state variable indicating the labor income and job displacement risk, especially
the risk of large adverse idiosyncratic events such as job loss that are pronounced in the higher
moments of income growth distribution. The βKMLi measures stock’s exposure to the labor income
risk directly from the covariances of the returns with the state variable. Hence, sorting stocks on the
βKMLi is conceptually different from sorting stocks on the share of displaceable labor, AP. Although
these two variables are related and correlate strongly, βKMLi captures stock i
′s co-movement with a
state variable that is highly relevant for investors marginal utility. The differences between sorting
on characteristics and sorting on covariances has been discussed in number of previous studies, e.g.
Daniel and Titman (1997).
I next examine the properties of the portfolios sorted by the βKML. Each year at the end
of June, I sort stocks into five portfolios by their βKML and hold the stocks in a given portfolio
from July of year t to June of year t+1. Panel A of table V reports the post-ranking exposure
to the I-shock measure across the portfolios. The exposure is estimated from regressing each
portfolio’s annual value-weighted return on a constant and the I-shock measure. The first portfolio
consisting of stocks with low βKML has strongly negative and significant exposure to the I-shock
measure. The coefficients are then increasing, absolute values are decreasing, across the portfolios
almost monotonically. The sole exception is the second portfolio, which has slightly more negative
exposure to the I-shock than portfolio one. This result shows that βKML successfully estimates
firms’ exposure to the underlying state variable, the I-shock measure. Firms’ exposure to the KML
portfolio predicts the exposure to the I-shock measure at horizon of at least one year. Panel B
shows additional properties of stocks within each portfolio. The fifth portfolio contains stocks with
32I require the stock to have at least 30 observations in the last 60 months.
33The results are also robust when the KML portfolio is orthogonalized to the factors of Fama and French (1993).
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relatively low share of displaceable labor compared to stocks in portfolio one. This is consistent
with low displaceable labor-share firms having weaker exposure to technology shocks.34 The book-
to-market ratio and market betas are slightly decreasing across the portfolios, while firm size is
somewhat increasing. Other characteristics are flat across the portfolios or do not exhibit a clear
pattern.
[Place Table V about here]
IV. Exposure to Technology Shocks and Return Premium
In this section, I investigate whether a stock’s expected return is related to the exposure of its
returns to technology shocks, βKML. I estimate the stock return premium using the cross section
of stocks. Then I examine the time variation and predictability of the premium. Finally, I show
that stocks exposure implies differential employment and investment behavior consistent with the
mechanism in the model.
A. Return Premium
To examine whether differences in stocks’ exposure to technology shocks are associated with
differences in their average returns, I sort stocks into five portfolios according to their βKML as
described in the previous section. For each portfolio, I calculate a time-series of monthly portfolio
returns as value-weighted average returns (unless stated otherwise) across all stocks in the portfolio
in a given month. The sample period is from 1975 to 2015.35
[Place Table VI about here]
Panel A of table VI reports the average annualized portfolio excess returns. The first portfolio
has the highest average excess return, 12.45%. This portfolio consists of stocks with the most
negative βKML. The average excess returns decrease monotonically across the portfolios. The
long-short, High-Low βKML, portfolio earns a negative premium of -6.85% per year. This premium
is statistically and economically significant.
The results are very similar for equally-weighted portfolio returns, reported in panel B. The
average excess returns decrease monotonically across the portfolios, although the return differences
are smaller. This results in a somewhat smaller return premium of the High-Low βKML portfolio,
-4.29% per year. The return premium is still statistically and economically significant.
I next examine whether the return differences can be explained by different exposures to ag-
gregate market risk. Panel C reports the results of regressing the portfolio monthly returns on a
constant and the market excess return. The estimated intercepts, alphas, exhibit similar pattern
34I show the time-series of the contemporaneous correlation between the share of displaceable labor AP and the
βKML at firm and industry level in appendix figure IA.5.
35The first five years 1970-1975 are used to estimate the βKML for portfolios formed in June 1975.
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as average excess returns. The first portfolio has the highest alpha of 2.97% per year. The alphas
decrease monotonically across portfolios. The High-Low βKML earns a significant and negative al-
pha of -5.39%. Although the estimated coefficients of the market returns decrease somewhat across
the portfolio, the differences in exposure to aggregate market risk cannot explain the differences in
average returns.
Panel D reports estimates of regressions that include also the size (SMB) and value (HML)
factors of Fama and French (1993) to control for potential exposure to these factors. The estimated
alphas are slightly smaller in their magnitude when compared to panel C, but the overall result is
similar. The alphas decrease across the portfolios almost monotonically. The only exception is the
second portfolio, whose alpha marginally exceeds the alpha of the first portfolio. The alpha of the
High-Low βKML portfolio is -3.6% and is significant at the 10% level. Although the coefficients
of the SMB factor also decrease across the portfolios, the differences in the exposure SMB factor
do not explain the return premium. The pattern in the SMB coefficients is consistent with the
evidence in table V indicating increasing stock size across the portfolios.
I repeat this analysis for the constituents of the S&P500 index, which are the largest and most
liquid stocks in the U.S. stock market. The results are very similar. They indicate a return premium
for High-Low βKML portfolio between -7.16% and -4.75% (see table IA.16 in the online appendix).
Hence, the results do not depend on the presence of small and illiquid stocks.36
I next use panel regressions with firms’ annual stock returns to differentiate the return premium
for stocks’ exposure to technology shocks, βKML, from well-known cross-sectional return predictors.
Specifically, I run panel regressions at the firm level:
Ri,t+1 = α+ γβKMLi
× βKMLi,t +
∑
n
γn ×Xi,n,t−1 + Y eart + i,t+1, (27)
where Ri,t+1 is firm i
′s annual stock return from July of year t to June of year t + 1, βKMLi,t is
a firm’s exposure to technology shock at the end of June of year t, Xi,n,t−1 are firm-level control
variables at the end of year t− 1, and Y eart is year fixed effect.37
Table VII presents the results of estimating the panel regression 27. The specification in column
(1) includes only a constant and βKML. The estimated coefficient is negative and strongly signif-
icant. The coefficient implies an average return differential of -8.71% per year between firms with
high and low βKML.38 Including the year fixed effect, column (2), leads to a lower coefficient that
36The results are also very similar when the stocks are sorted into portfolios based on βKML that is estimated
from multivariate rolling regressions including the size (SMB) and value (HML) factors of Fama and French (1993)
as control variables (see table IA.17 in the appendix).
37The control variables Xi,n,t−1 that are based on data from firms’ financial statements, i.e. book-to-market ratio,
cashflow, financial leverage, price-to-cost margin, profitability, and size, are calculated from financial statements for
fiscal year ending in year t − 1. This allows a lag of 6-18 months for the information to become publicly available.
Market betat−1 is estimated over the last 60 months ending in June of year t. Turnover is calculated over the calendar
year t− 1.
38I calculate the average return differential by multiplying the estimated coefficient of βKML, -3.829, with the
average difference in βKML between the 95th and 5th percentile, 2.275. The average difference in βKML is calculated
as time-series average of contemporaneous differences in βKML between the 95th and 5percentile. The implied return
premium for the average difference in βKML between the 75th and 25th percentile is -4.826%.
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implies a return premium of -3.64%. Columns (3)-(10) show results for regressions that include
βKML, year fixed effect and one of the control variables Xi,n,t. Each of these control variables has
only a negligible impact on the estimated coefficient of βKML. The coefficients are negative and
significant across the specifications with different control variables. The implied return difference
between firms with high and low βKML ranges from -3.29% to -4.62% per year. The regression
in the last column controls jointly for all variables Xi,n,t and the year fixed effect. The estimated
coefficient of βKML remains negative and statistically significant. The slightly higher magnitude
implies an annual return premium of -4.8%.
[Place Table VII about here]
The estimated coefficients of βKML imply a similar return premium for firms’ exposure to
technology shocks as the portfolio analysis described above. I show in online appendix table IA.18
that the estimation results are similar for the constituents of the S&P500. The coefficient of βKML
is also robust to controlling for additional firm- and industry-level variables (see appendix tables
IA.23 and IA.24).
The panel regressions assume a strictly linear relationship between stock returns and the cross-
sectional return predictors. To control for a potentially non-linear relationship, I use conditional
double sorts. Specifically, in the first step I sort stocks into three baskets based on the value of the
control variable. In the second step, I sorts the stocks within each of these baskets again into three
additional baskets according to the βKML. This creates a total of 9 baskets. I then create three
portfolios by pooling all stocks in the βKML-based baskets with the same rank. This procedure
creates portfolios sorted on βKML that are relatively independent of the return predictors used in
the first step.39
Table VIII reports the average value-weighted portfolio returns. I first report the average
portfolio returns for unconditional sorting on βKML, column (1). The average return differential
based on unconditional sorting into three portfolios is -6.6% per year. Column (2) shows results
for βKML-sorted portfolios conditional on the book-to-market ratio. The portfolio with the low
βKML stocks has the highest average return of 10.83% per year. The average return decreases
monotonically across the remaining two portfolios. The conditional High-Low βKML portfolio
earns a statistically and economically significant return premium of -5.23% per year. This return
premium is relatively independent of the differences in firms’ book-to-market ratio. Columns (3)-
(9) show that conditioning the portfolio sorts on other cross-sectional return predictors provides
very similar results. The average portfolio returns decrease across the portfolios. The premium
for the High-Low βKML portfolio ranges between -4.21% and -5.43% per year and is statistically
significant and economically large. Results based on the constituents of S&P500 are very similar
(see appendix table IA.19). The return premium is also robust to conditioning on other firm- and
industry-level variables (see appendix table IA.25 and IA.26). For a comparison, the last column
39In an alternative approach, I first calculate time-series of value-weighted portfolio returns for each of the nine
conditionally-sorted portfolios. I then create three portfolios by calculating a simple average across the βKML-sorted
portfolios with the same rank. The results based on this approach are very similar.
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shows the premium for the book-to-market ratio conditional on firms’ size. The conditional value
premium is 2.15% but not statistically significant.
The portfolio return analysis, panel regressions and conditional double sorts imply similar return
premium for firms’ exposure to technology shocks. The latter two methods show that the return
premium is not driven by linear or non-linear relationship with well-known cross-sectional return
predictors.
[Place Table VIII about here]
B. Time Variation and Predictability of the Return Premium
In this section, I examine whether the return premium varies over time and is predictable. As
mentioned above, technology shocks are an important source of labor income and job displacement
risk and the I-shock measure predicts higher moments of individual income growth distribution.
Hence the I-shock measure can be considered a state variable for households’ marginal utility. This
evidence gives rise to the consideration that a return premium of an asset with a strong exposure
to the technology shock is predictable by this state variable.
I use the I-shock measure to forecast the return premium of the Low-High βKML portfolio. I
focus on the Low-High βKML instead of High-Low βKML portfolio to facilitate the interpretation
of the return premium. This portfolio has negative exposure to technology shocks and earns a
positive return premium (see table VI). Specifically, I run forecasting regressions of the cumulative
log return premium for the Low-High βKML portfolio,
∑y
s=1 r
βKML
t+s , over y years, on the I-shock
measure Ishockt:
y∑
s=1
rβ
KML
t+s = a
(y) + b(y)Ishockt + e
(y)
t+y. (28)
Panel A of table IX reports the estimation results of the forecasting regression for the one-
to five-year cumulative log return premium of the Low-High βKML portfolio. The estimated co-
efficients have the expected positive sign; a decrease in relative prices of capital goods - positive
technology shock increases the return premium. The estimated coefficients are marginally statisti-
cally significant for return horizons of two, three and four years. The magnitude of the coefficient
is economically important. For example, a positive technology shock of one standard deviation
increases the expected two-year return by 2.4%. Panel B shows the results of the forecasting re-
gressions that include additional forecasting variables. The estimated coefficient of the I-shock have
similar magnitude and remain statistically significant for the same return horizons.
[Place Table IX about here]
Figure 7 plots the I-shock measure and the subsequent realized three-years cumulative log return
premium of the Low-High βKML portfolio. The return premium varies over time together with the
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I-shock measure. Both time-series overlap relatively closely. Periods of substantial decreases in the
relative prices of capital goods predict a high return premium for the Low-High βKML portfolio.
[Place Figure 7 about here]
As discussed above, labor income and job displacement risk are high in states of large positive
technology shocks. This evidence suggests that the time-varying return premium can be compen-
sation for this type of risk. Households will seek a return premium for assets that have negative
exposure to states of high labor income risk. The time variation of the return premium between
the states of high and low technology shocks supports this explanation.
C. Firms’ Responses to Technological Shocks
The evidence in earlier sections shows large differences in firms’ risk exposure to technology
shocks. In this section, I investigate whether firms with different exposure to technology shocks
differ also in their employment, investment, sales and financial performance when the relative prices
of capital goods decrease. Costly employment and capital adjustments, and changes in firms’ sales
following technology shocks can affect firms’ financial performance and contribute to firms’ risk
exposure. To explore this mechanism, I estimate panel regressions in the form:
∆yi,t+s = b0 Ishockt + b1 I
βKML
i,t + b2 Ishockt × Iβ
KML
i,t (29)
+controlsi,t + TFPt + Trendt + ei,t+s,
where ∆yi,t+s is the firm i
′s percentage change in employment, capital, capital-labor ratio, sales,
percentage points change in return on capital, or return on equity between years t and t + 3,
Ishockt is the I-shock measure in year t, I
βKML
i,t is an index between 0 and 9 indicating the decile of
cross-sectionally ranked firms’ exposure to technology shock, βKMLi,t , and Ishockt × Iβ
KML
i,t is their
interaction term. Controlsi,t is a set of firm-specific control variables consisting of firms’ capital
Ki,t, age Agei,t, market capitalization Sizei,t, firm fixed effects, and a lagged dependent variable
at one-year horizon t − 1 to t. The regressions include TFP shock TFPt and deterministic trend
Trendt as aggregate control variables.
Panel A of table X reports the results of estimating regression equation (29) for changes in em-
ployment, capital and capital-labor ratio. The first column shows that a positive technology shock
on average decreases firms’ employment. The coefficient of the I-shock measure is negative, statis-
tically significant and economically large. The effect of the technology shock differs significantly
across firms with different βKMLi,t . The positive coefficient of the interaction term Ishockt× Iβ
KML
i,t
indicates that the effect is stronger for firms with negative exposure to technology shocks. In the
next two columns, I split the sample in halves based on firms βKML and estimate the panel regres-
sion (29) without the interaction term. Firms in the first half have strongly negative exposure to
technology shocks, while firms in the second half have only mild exposure that is much closer to
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zero (see table V). The results show that firms with strongly negative exposure decrease employ-
ment following a positive technology shock. At the same time, employment is on average constant
in firms with mild exposure over the same time horizon. The following three columns show that
technology shocks increase firms’ capital. The effect is approximately equal for firms with strongly
negative and mild exposure. This result is consistent with evidence discussed above (see table II)
and indicates that lower quality-adjusted relative prices of capital goods lead to higher investment.
The last three columns show that technology shocks increase firms’ capital-labor ratio. The effect
is again stronger for firms with strongly negative exposure.
[Place Table X about here]
As described earlier, firms with strongly negative exposure to technology shocks are generally
firms with very high share of displaceable labor (see table V). The results indicate that these
firms indeed adjust, potentially automate, their production processes by decreasing the number of
employees and investing in capital when a technology shock occurs.
Panel B reports the results of the percentage changes in sales and percentage point changes in
return on capital and return on equity. The first column shows that a technology shock has negative
impact on firms’ sales. The estimated coefficient is statistically and economically significant. The
following two columns show that the effect is stronger for firms with strongly negative exposure.
The estimated coefficient of the I-shock measure is more than twice as large for firms with strong
exposure compared to firms with mild exposure. The next three columns show that lower relative
prices of capital goods decrease firms’ return on capital. This effect is again larger for firms with
strong risk exposure. The estimates in the last three columns indicate also negative and strongly
differential effect of technology shock on the return on equity. Firms with strongly negative exposure
experience decreases in return on equity almost twice as large as firms with mild exposure. The
estimated coefficients are statistically significant and economically large.
I repeat the analysis for different time horizons. I report the results for a time horizon of three
years in appendix table IA.27. The results are qualitatively very similar. The estimated coefficients
are generally larger as they refer to changes compounded over three years. These results indicate
that the differential effects of technology shocks between firms with strong and mild risk exposure
are not driven by potential lead-lag differences in firms’ responses.
The theoretical model presented earlier highlights the importance of competition for the eco-
nomic mechanism how technology shocks affect firm value through costly technology adoption.
Hence, one can easily develop an intuition that the effects of technology shocks will be larger in
highly competitive industries. I next investigate whether the effects of the technology shocks differ
between firms in highly competitive and less competitive industries. To test this conjecture, I split
the sample into two halves by the degree of competition and estimate the panel regression (29)
without the interaction term for firms with strong and mild exposure within each half separately. I
measure the degree of industry competition by the Herfindahl-Hirschman index of sales at the level
of SIC 3 digit industries.
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Panel A of table XI reports the results for percentage changes in employment and capital. The
estimated coefficients have the same sign as discussed earlier. A positive technology shock decreases
firms’ employment and increases capital. For firms with strongly negative exposure, these effects
are stronger in highly competitive industries. For firms with mild exposure, the effect on capital is
stronger in highly competitive industries, but the effect on employment is weaker.
[Place Table XI about here]
Panel B reports the results for percentage changes in capital-labor ratio and sales. The estimated
coefficients of the I-shock measure have uniformly higher magnitude in highly competitive industries
for both firms with strong and mild exposure. Firms with strongly negative exposure increase their
capital-labor ratio upon the occurrence of a technology shock more if they are in highly competitive
industries. These firms experience also more severe decrease in sales in comparison to firms in less
competitive industries. This pattern holds equally for firms with mild exposure.
In panel C, I report the results for percentage point changes in return on capital and return on
equity. The effects of the technology shocks on these two variables are generally more pronounced
in highly competitive industries. Firms experience a stronger decrease in the return on capital as
well as in the return on equity if they are in more competitive industries.
The findings in this section document that firms with differential exposure to technology shocks
have different employment and capital adjustment in years following a decrease in prices of capital
goods, while financial performance is also affected. Firms with strongly negative exposure have
generally high share of displaceable labor and tend to increase their capital-labor ratio after tech-
nology shocks. During this process they experience lower sales, return on capital and return on
equity. This evidence indicates that the risk exposure to technology shocks reflects firms’ financial
underperformance after the shocks. Industry competition generally increases the observed effects.
V. Conclusion
The potential of capital to substitute some types of labor and complement others plays a central
role in economic models that study the effects of technological change. I find that firms’ potential to
automate the production process is also an important determinant of firms’ exposure to technology
shocks. Technology shocks embodied in capital are an important driver of stock returns with a
differential impact over the cross section of stocks.
I show theoretically that the firms’ share of displaceable labor that can be automated by cap-
ital can increase firms’ riskiness in a competitive environment. Firms in industries with high
displaceable labor share have negative exposure to technology shocks that facilitate automation.
Automation becomes a costly necessity for firms to stay competitive as competition eliminates its
benefits for firms and passes them to the consumers in form of lower product prices. This result is
strongly supported by empirical evidence.
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I show empirically that firms with high share of displaceable labor have very strong and negative
exposure to technology shocks. I document that a macroeconomic measure of technology shocks
based on prices of capital goods can be successfully approximated by stock returns of a zero-cost
portfolio based on firms’ share of displaceable labor and this portfolios has captured all major
technology shocks over the last four decades. I further show that firms exposure to technology
shocks that facilitate automation earn a robust and time-varying return premium that can be
empirically and theoretically rationalized as a compensation for households’ job displacement and
labor income risk. The exposure to technology shocks is associated with firms’ adjustment of
the capital-labor ratio and underperformance after a decrease in relative prices of capital goods
consistent with the model prediction.
My model abstracts from other interesting economic aspects such as market entry, differential
ability to adopt new technology or operating leverage, which are certainly relevant in some real
world scenarios and worth exploring both empirically and theoretically. Future research can also
focus on a multiperiod fully dynamic setting of my model with endogenous arrival of technology
shocks. Such model can deliver richer implications for asset prices as well as implications for
differential growth between heterogeneous industries.
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Appendix A. Equilibrium and Market Clearing Conditions
The CES aggregator technology at the sector implies optimal demand functions for the firm-
specific goods of the form:
Yf,s,t =
(
P lf,s,t
Ps,t
)−ν
Ys,t and Yf,s,t =
(
P kf,s,t
Ps,t
)−ν
Ys,t for s = 1, 2 and t = 1, 2 (A1)
The CES aggregator technology at the aggregate level implies optimal demand function for the
sector-specific goods of the form:
Ys,t =
(
Ps,t
PA,t
)−ρ
YA,t (A2)
Market clearing condition for the aggregate good is defined as
Nh∑
h=1
ch,t = YA,t (A3)
Market clearing on the labor markets is defined as:
Ll1,1 =
Nh∑
h=1
Lh,1,1
Ll1,2 + L
k
1,2 =
Nh∑
h=1
Lh,1,2
Lk1,t =
Nh∑
h=1
Lh,2,t for t = 1, 2
(A4)
where the Lls,t is labor used directly in goods production in sector s and L
k
s,t is labor used in
production of capital in sector s. The market clearing on the investment capital market is:
N∑
f=1
Kf,1,21{Automated = Y es}f,1,2 = Kα1,t
N∑
f=1
Kf,2,t = K
α
2,t for t = 1, 2.
(A5)
Appendix B. The O*NET Database
The O*NET database provides a comprehensive set of characteristics describing occupations in
a number of dimensions such as workers’ abilities, skills, knowledge and experience, work values,
work styles, work activities, etc. The O*NET collects the underlying data in a two-stage design.
First, O*NET selects a statistically random sample of businesses that are expected to employ
targeted occupations. Second, it selects a random sample of workers in the targeted occupations
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within those businesses and collects the data by surveying the job incumbents using questionnaires.
Additional variables such as variables describing skills and abilities are developed from the workers’
responses by occupational analysts. O*NET continuously updates the occupational characteristics
by ongoing surveys and provides updated occupational characteristics in new database releases
quarterly/semi-annually starting from 2003. This procedure allows to track the changes in occu-
pational characteristics. The first releases of the O*NET database before 2003, however, are based
on the data from Dictionary of Occupational Titles (DOT), which is a predecessor of O*NET. The
underlying data in DOT refers to years 1991 (revised 4th edition) and 1977 (4th edition). The
number of occupations in the O*NET database releases varies between 812 and 1122 occupations
depending on the occupational classification used in each database release. The occupations are
currently classified by the 2010 O*NET - Standard Occupational Classification (O*NET SOC) that
is a refined classification based on 2010 Standard Occupational Classification (SOC). 40
Appendix C. Validity and Robustness of the RTI Measure
The construction of the RTI measure involves some degree of subjectivity in selecting the un-
derlying descriptors as well as in the aggregation of the task inputs into one number expressing the
routine task intensity. To address the potential concerns stemming from the freedom of selecting
the underlying descriptors, I constructed alternative RTI measures from subsets and extended sets
of descriptors and found that alternative measures identify routine and non-routine occupations in a
very similar way. An aggregation of the underlying task inputs without logarithmic transformation
as in formula 24 also generates very comparable RTI measure. I also compare my RTI measure with
the original RTI measure from Autor and Dorn (2013). When matched to the common occupa-
tional classification, the measures have strong positive correlations across the occupations. Routine
intensive occupations identified by each of these measures overlap and the overlap is also strong for
non-routine occupations. The fact that these measures are constructed from different data sources
and using different occupational characteristics but still succeed to identify the occupational routine
task intensity in a very similar way increases the validity of these measures. Despite these validity
and robustness checks, the use of the RTI measure still requires caution. First the underlying data
can still be subject to some measurement errors and the selected descriptors may not necessarily
describe all dimensions of routine intensity or automation potential of a given occupation. Second
the RTI measure is defined only up to the occupational level and hence omits any variation in the
routine task intensity across workers in the same occupation or of the same occupation across differ-
ent firms. Given these concerns, the RTI measure has to be considered as an imprecise measure of
the routine tasks and automation potential.41 Second, the given specification of the RTI measure is
still time- and technology-dependent. Although, I use multiple data sources that update the occu-
40The previous releases of the O*NET database are based on previous versions of O*NET-SOC, namely 2000, 2006,
and 2009. The first release of the O*NET database in 1998 uses O*NET 98 OU classification that is based on the
Occupational Employment Statistics classification (OES classification).
41David (2013) discusses the challenges of measuring task inputs in more detail.
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pational characteristics over time, the choice of the underlying descriptors reflects the current and
past state of the technology. For instance, ’Operating vehicles, mechanized devices, or equipment’
is used as a descriptor of non-routine manual task input. Using this measure, occupations such as
bus, truck, and taxi drivers or commercial pilots are ranked as non-routine which reflects the state
of the technology in most of the 20th century. The advances in technology, however, change the
character of these occupations towards more routine intensive and potentially automatable. For
example, various version of autopilots are widely used in commercial airplanes and their capabilities
to assist during different phases of the flight have been constantly increasing. Similarly, a number
of tasks involved in driving a car or truck, such as manually changing the gears or navigation, have
been automated or significantly facilitated. Currently a number of companies both within and
outside of car manufacturing are developing and testing systems for autonomous/automated vehi-
cles. Given the ongoing changes in the available technology, this descriptor, ’Operating vehicles,
mechanized devices, or equipment’, may be re-classified to measure routine manual input in near
future.
I match the RTI measured at the occupational level to firm-level observations by the OES
conducted by Bureau of Labor Statistics. OES provides detailed tables of occupational composition
of the labor force at a detailed industry level starting from 1988. The industries are classified at
SIC 3-digit or NAICS 4-digit level across the whole U.S. economy. The number of industries
ranges between 290 and 378.42 I extrapolate the occupational composition from the first OES
releases to the years before 1988 to extend my sample to 1970. To translate the RTI measure
from occupational level to industry level, I calculate for each industry the percentage of employees
employed in routine intensive occupations. I define routine intensive occupations as occupations
above the top employment-weighted tercile of occupations ranked by RTI score in a given year.43
I report the exact match of the underlying OES file and the corresponding release of the O*NET
database in the online appendix table IA.21. I transform the RTI from industry to firm level by
imposing the percentage of employees in routine occupations in a given industry to all firms in that
industry. Since the main focus of this paper is on the between-industry variation, the omission of
the intra-industry variation in the RTI is not a limitation. Moreover, I will show in the subsequent
text that there is a strong relationship between labor-intensity and routine task intensity.
To validate the AP measure, I examine whether it can predict future automation. Automation,
generally, refers to the substitution of machines or equipment for human workers in performing
specific tasks. This can be reflected in various adjustments such as higher use of machines, reduction
of employment and/or changes in the use of technology by specific occupations. Table IA.8 in
online appendix shows that industry’s share of routine labor predicts the use of information and
communication equipment (ICT) per worker over the following two decades. This relationship is
especially strong for manufacturing industries and is robust to other factors such as offshorability
and import penetration. I next examine whether the RTI also predicts the use of technology within
42I report the exact number of industries in each OES release in online appendix, table IA.20
43The results in the subsequent sections are very similar if I use different thresholds such as 70-th percentile or
80-th percentile.
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occupations. For each occupation, I calculate a technology-use index measuring the use of various
forms of technology such as computers and electronics and the importance of technology-relevant
skills such as programming or controlling machines. I report the full set of the underlying variables
in online appendix table IA.6. Table IA.9 in online appendix shows that occupational routine task
intensity predicts the use of technology at occupational level. Occupations with relatively higher
RTI score experienced relatively higher increase in the technology-use index in the following years.
These two results indicate that the AP measure and its component, the RTI measure, indeed predict
automation at industry and occupational level, respectively.44
Appendix D. Filtering the Stock Return Data
The sample consists of common stocks listed at the NYSE, NASDAQ, and AMEX. I exclude
financials SIC 6000-6799, utilities SIC 4900-4999, and public sector companies SIC≥9000. To avoid
the results to be driven by small and micro-cap firms, I exclude the bottom 20% of firms ranked
by market capitalization. I also exclude the bottom 10% of firms ranked by the share price. The
results are similar when firms with share price below 2 dollars are excluded. I further exclude
firms in the bottom 5% by trading volume. Results are similar when more restrictive percentiles
are applied. I further exclude firms with less than 500 employees or total net property, plant and
equipment less than 5 millions. Estimation of firm’s betas requires the firm to have monthly data
over at least last 30 months. The sample of S&P500 firms consists of the continuously updated
index constituents constituents. I also exclude financials and utilities.
Appendix E. Measuring the Technology Shocks Embodied in
Capital, Details
I formally derive the validity of the I-shock measure in a simple two-sector model from Cummins
and Violante (2002). Final goods producers competitively produce final goods xt at price p
c
t . The
final goods can be either consumed or used as an input for production of capital goods. The
capital goods sector can produce it efficiency units from xt units of consumption goods according
to production function it = qt xt. qt captures the level of technology in the capital goods sector.
Prices in the capital goods sector are set competitively so that pitit = p
c
txt. Combining this result
with the production function leads to pit/p
c
t = 1/qt and hence ∆qt = ∆p
c
t − ∆pit. Accordingly,
the changes in the prices of capital goods relative to consumption goods measure the investment
specific technology shock qt. Based on this model, I construct the measures of the technology shock
by subtracting the annual log changes in the quality-adjusted prices of capital goods from the log
44Other studies also provide supportive evidence. For instance, a companion paper Knesl (2018) shows that
manufacturing industries with high share of routine labor substitute equipment capital for human workers following
technology shocks. Autor and Dorn (2013) document a differential reduction of employment of routine occupations
in commuting zone with originally high share of routine labor. Spitz-Oener (2006) documents a differential increase
in requirements for complex skills in rapidly computerizing occupations.
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changes in prices of consumption goods. Accordingly, an increase in the I-shock measure indicates
a positive technology shock embodied in capital.
The prices of the capital goods are from the price index of private fixed investment in nonresiden-
tial equipment provided by the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis. This price index is a composite
of price indexes of 25 different types of equipment that are broadly categorized as information
processing equipment, industrial equipment, transportation equipment, and other equipment. I
measure the aggregate prices by the BEA’s price index of personal consumption expenditures for
nondurable goods. The sampling frequency of both time series is annual. I use the data from 1970
to 2015. To account for possible bias due to lack of quality adjustment in the price indexes of
capital goods, I use the underlying data from Cummins and Violante (2002) and extrapolate the
quality adjustment until 2015. The data in Cummins and Violante (2002) directly accounts for the
quality changes in the 24 types of equipment that comprise the aggregate price index of capital
goods. The quality adjustment is based on the original data from Gordon (1990). To construct
the I-shock measure, I subtract the log change in the quality-adjusted prices of capital goods from
the log change in prices of nondurable consumption goods. I also calculate an alternative measure
without using the quality adjustment from Cummins and Violante (2002). This measure relies
completely on the quality adjustment in the underlying price indexes from BEA. The results in
this paper are very similar when I use the alternative measure. The time-series variation of both
measures is very similar. The major difference between the quality-adjusted and the alternative
measure is the long-term average. The average is higher for the quality-adjusted measure as it
reflects the improvements in quality of the capital goods over time.
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Figure 2. Three Types of Sector Equilibria. This figure plots the relationship between the
prices of goods (panel A), demand for goods (panel B), and dividends (panel C) of labor-based
and automated firms and the percentage of automated firms δ within the sector. Plots in the first
column show a state of no shock. The parameter z2 is chosen so that the good prices of each type
of firm are same when no firm automates (δ∗ = 0). Plots in the middle column show a situation
with an incremental technology shock when a percentage of firms (0 < δ∗ < 1) automates. Plots
on the right-hand side show a situation of large disruptive technology shocks when all firms in the
sector automate despite automation cost κ, (δ∗ = 1). The black horizontal line depicts the original
dividend level. The model parameters are: ρ = 0.6, ν = 0.95, χ = 1, θ = 2, N = 1000, Nh = 100,
ALow = 0.85, AHigh = 0.95, 1.05, β = 0.85, γ = 21,  = 0.39, pH = 0.15, p = 0.5, and κ = 8×10−5.
Demand fo firms’ goods and firms’ dividends are scaled by a factor 100.
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Figure 3. Technological Shocks, Equilibrium Automation, and Profits. This figure plots
the equilibrium relationship between the magnitude of the technology shock At and percentage of
firms that automate within the sector 1 (panel A), the dividends of firms in sector 1 (panel B)
and the dividends of firms in sector 2 (panel C). Model parameters are stated in the description of
figure 2. Dividends are scaled by a factor 100.
Figure 4. Firms’ Exposure to Technological Shock and Expected Returns. This figure
plots the relationship between the magnitude of the technology shocks and firms’ exposure (panel
A), the relationship between the magnitude of the technology shock and expected stock returns
(panel B), and the differences in expected stock returns between firms in sector 1 and sector 2
(panel C). Model parameters are stated in the description of figure 2.
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Figure 5. Idiosyncratic Labor Productivity  and the Risk Premium for Technological
Shocks. This figure plots the risk premium for technology shocks E
[
RI
] − Rf as a function of
the idiosyncratic labor productivity risk . RI is a return on an asset that has β = 1 to technology
shock A2. The magnitude of the technology shock A
High is chosen so that all firms in sector s = 1
automate (δ∗). Model parameters are stated in the description of figure 2.
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Figure 6. Technological Shocks (I-shock) and Low AP minus High AP Firms. This
figure plots the I-shock measure (dashed blue line) and the annual return of the zero-cost (KML)
portfolio (solid red line). The zero-cost portfolio has a long position in firms with low share of
displaceable labor , i.e. the bottom quintile of firms ranked by the AP measure, and a short
position in firms with high share of displaceable labor, i.e. the top quintile. The portfolio returns
within the short and long position of the KML portfolio are value weighted. The KML portfolio in
this figure consists of stocks from S&P500 except for financial and utilities firms. Both time-series
are plotted at annual frequency and are normalized to mean zero and standard deviation of one.
The sample period is from 1970 to 2015.
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Figure 7. The I-shock Measure and Following 3-Year Cumulative Return of the Low-
High βKML Portfolio. This figure plots the I-shock measure (dashed blue line) and the subsequent
realized three-year cumulative log return of the zero-cost Low-High βKML portfolio (solid red line).
The zero-cost portfolio has a long position in stocks with low βKML and short position in stocks
with high βKML. The portfolio returns within the short and long position are value-weighted.
The portfolio is rebalanced annually at the end of June. Both time-series are plotted at annual
frequency and are normalized to mean zero and standard deviation of one. The sample period is
from 1970 to 2015.
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Table I
Summary Statistics and Variance Decomposition of the AP measure
This table reports the summary statistics of the AP measure and its main components, ln
(
K
L
)
and L
routine
Ltotal
. (-)AP denotes ln
(
K
Lroutine
)
to avoid negative numbers and facilitate readability. The
reported results are time-series averages of cross-sectional statistics. Panel A shows the summary
statistics at the firm level and panel B at the industry level. Panel C reports the variance decom-
position of the 1/AP measure and its components into within and between industry variance. The
number in panel C denote the percentage of total variance. By construction, L
routine
Ltotal
has 100%
variance at industry level. Industries are defined at SIC 1987 3-digit and NAICS 2002 4-digit level.
Mean Median St. dev. Min Max
Panel A. Summary statistics at the firm level
(-)AP 4.379 4.186 1.274 -1.689 9.442
ln
(
K
L
)
3.363 3.221 1.156 -2.428 8.142
Panel B. Summary statistics at the industry level
(-)AP 4.452 4.229 1.204 1.191 8.682
ln
(
K
L
)
3.413 3.248 1.064 0.306 7.172
Lroutine
Ltotal
0.407 0.407 0.187 0.043 0.814
Panel C. Decomposition of variance into within and between
industry components
(-)AP ln
(
K
L
)
Lroutine
Ltotal
Within industries 28.33 34.87 0
Between industries 71.67 65.13 100
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Table II
Technological Shocks and Investment, Employment, and Income Growth
This table reports the results of regressing contemporaneous and future changes in investment,
employment and income, panel A, and change in moments of income growth distribution, panel B,
on the I-shock measure and TFP shock. The regression is of the form 1K+1
∑K
k=0 yt+k − yt+k−1 =
α + γIshock × Ishockt + γTFP × TFPt + t+k, for time horizons K = 0, 1, and 2. Ishockt is the
I-shock measure representing the change in quality-adjusted relative prices of capital goods between
t − 1 and t. TFPt is the change in aggregate productivity between t − 1 and t. The regressions
are estimated at annual frequency. The time period in panel A is from 1970 to 2015 and in panel
B from 1978 to 2010. *** Significant at the 1 percent level. ** Significant at the 5 percent level. *
Significant at the 10 percent level. Source: Income, investment and employment: U.S. Bureau of
Economic Analysis; Moments of income growth distribution: Guvenen et al. (2014).
Panel A. Impact of technological shock on income, investment and employment
Investment Employment Personal income
t t+1 t+2 t t+1 t+2 t t+1 t+2
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Constant -0.026 0.038 0.065*** 0.005 0.026*** 0.026*** 0.06*** 0.122*** 0.094***
(0.024) (0.028) (0.019) (0.006) (0.009) (0.006) (0.01) (0.018) (0.014)
Ishock 1.296*** 0.516 -0.201 0.081 -0.184* -0.272*** -0.204* -0.472** -0.453***
(0.348) (0.474) (0.298) (0.063) (0.103) (0.077) (0.113) (0.202) (0.139)
TFP 2.383*** 4.775*** 2.457*** 0.662*** 1.156*** 0.748*** 0.289 0.223 0.183
(0.802) (1.42) (0.732) (0.194) (0.339) (0.194) (0.425) (0.719) (0.469)
R2 41.05 29.2 20.47 26.3 25.36 36.16 7.95 10.12 18.61
Panel B. Impact of technological shock on distribution of income growth
Mean Standard deviation Skewness
t t+1 t+2 t t+1 t+2 t t+1 t+2
Constant 0.024** 0.042*** 0.018** -0.008** -0.015*** -0.009** 0.168* 0.279*** 0.119**
(0.011) (0.009) (0.008) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.087) (0.088) (0.052)
Ishock -0.524** -0.785*** -0.319* 0.116 0.253** 0.156 -4.814** -6.545*** -2.839**
(0.254) (0.167) (0.163) (0.104) (0.115) (0.102) (1.932) (1.575) (1.055)
TFP 0.117 -0.487 -0.378* 0.012 -0.094 -0.069 6.594** 2.247 0.461
(0.393) (0.361) (0.21) (0.165) (0.152) (0.103) (2.473) (2.594) (1.565)
R2 17.33 36.2 26.11 6.4 15.82 15.98 37.66 33.51 22.31
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Table III
Correlation between the I-shock Measure and the Long-Short (KML)
Portfolios Based on the between- and within-industry Automation Potential
This table reports the correlation coefficients between the I-shock measure and the long-short
portfolio (KML) constructed by the AP measure based on within or between industry variations.
The long-short portfolios in the ’Between’ row are constructed by ranking industries by the industry-
level average share of displaceable labor, AP. The long position consists of industries in the bottom
quintile ranked by the AP measure and the short position of industries in the top quintile. The
long-short portfolios in the ’Within’ row are constructed by ranking individual firms by firms’
deviation from the industry average share of displaceable labor. The long position consists of firms
in the bottom quintile ranked deviation from industry’s average AP and the short position of firms
in the top quintile. Industries are defined at SIC 4-digit level in column 1, SIC 3-digit level in
column 2, NAICS 6-digit level in column 3, and NAICS 5-digit level in column 4.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
SIC 4 SIC 3 NAICS 6 NAICS 5
Between industries 0.586 0.583 0.545 0.529
Within industries 0.266 0.235 0.24 0.312
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Table IV
Exposure of Portfolio Returns to Technological Shocks (I-shocks)
This table reports the results from regressing portfolio annual excess returns on a constant, the
I-shock measure and return factors. Regressions in panel A include a constant and the I-shock
measure. The aggregate market return (CRSP value-weighted index) is added to the regressions
in panel B, and the size (SMB) and value (HML) factors of Fama and French (1993) are added
to the regressions in panel C. Stocks are assigned to one of five portfolios based on the share of
displaceable labor, AP. Portfolios are rebalanced annually at the end of June. Portfolio returns are
value-weighted. The sample period is from 1970 to 2015. Newey and West (1987) standard errors
are in parentheses. *** Significant at the 1 percent level. ** Significant at the 5 percent level. *
Significant at the 10 percent level.
High AP 2 3 4 Low AP
Low-High AP
KML
Panel A. Exposure to I-shock measure
Ishock -3.381*** -2.714*** -2.443*** -1.957** -1.04 2.341***
(0.952) (0.685) (0.811) (0.809) (0.808) (0.466)
R2 29.19% 28.21% 20.53% 15.31% 4.43% 30.15%
Panel B. Exposure to I-shock measure and aggregate market
Ishock -1.646*** -1.197*** -0.691*** -0.264 0.725*** 2.37***
(0.396) (0.338) (0.246) (0.226) (0.258) (0.453)
Market 0.955*** 0.835*** 0.965*** 0.932*** 0.971*** 0.016
(0.091) (0.069) (0.036) (0.036) (0.058) (0.119)
R2 81.79% 88.47% 92.74% 93.67% 91.63% 30.18%
Panel C. Exposure to I-shock measure, aggregate market,
and factors of Fama and French (1993)
Ishock -1.365*** -1.068*** -0.751*** -0.386* 0.564** 1.929***
(0.228) (0.264) (0.249) (0.21) (0.252) (0.314)
Market 0.94*** 0.861*** 0.934*** 0.905*** 0.959*** 0.02
(0.047) (0.041) (0.035) (0.03) (0.036) (0.059)
SMB 0.526*** 0.117 0.014 -0.102** -0.22*** -0.746***
(0.098) (0.074) (0.085) (0.046) (0.059) (0.142)
HML 0.033 0.109 -0.102 -0.109 -0.079 -0.112
(0.137) (0.118) (0.073) (0.065) (0.082) (0.152)
R2 89.96% 89.62% 93.08% 94.7% 94.31% 66.84%
53
Table V
Properties of Portfolios Sorted on βKML
This table reports the results from regressing portfolio annual excess returns on a constant and
the I-shock measure in panel A and time-series averages of additional characteristics across the
stocks within each portfolio in panel B. Stocks are assigned to one of five to portfolios based on
their exposure to the KML portfolio, βKMLi . Portfolios are rebalanced annually at the end of June.
Portfolio returns are value-weighted. Newey and West (1987) standard errors are in parentheses.
(-)AP is the negative of firm’s displaceable labor share measured by (−1) × ln
(
Lroutine
K
)
, BM is
the book-to-market ratio, βmarket is the regression coefficient of market excess return from rolling
time-series regressions of firm excess return onto market excess return and a constant, CF denotes
cash flow, Lev denotes financial leverage, PCM denotes the price-to-cost margin, Profitability is the
ratio of sales minus cost of goods sold, interest expenses, and selling, general, and administrative
expenses to book equity, Size is the natural logarithm of the market capitalization in thousands,
and Turnover is the fraction of shares traded to the total shares outstanding. The sample period
is from 1975 to 2015. *** Significant at the 1 percent level. ** Significant at the 5 percent level. *
Significant at the 10 percent level.
Low βKML 2 3 4 High βKML
Panel A. Exposure to I-shock, postranking betas
Ishock -2.319** -2.495*** -1.744*** -1.701*** -1.18
(1.109) (0.888) (0.606) (0.582) (0.754)
R2 14.22% 25.4% 13.05% 12.72% 6.32%
Panel B. Additional properties
(-)AP 4.047 4.068 4.099 4.187 4.623
BM 0.677 0.664 0.668 0.655 0.619
βmarket 1.431 1.166 1.077 1.052 1.180
CF 0.089 0.095 0.096 0.094 0.092
Lev 0.330 0.322 0.314 0.316 0.310
PCM 0.310 0.321 0.317 0.319 0.331
Profitability 0.249 0.256 0.255 0.247 0.230
Size 5.576 5.909 6.063 6.119 6.240
Turnover 0.109 0.086 0.080 0.081 0.101
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Table VI
Mean Portfolio Returns and Alphas of Portfolios Sorted on βKML
This table reports the time-series averages of value-weighted portfolio excess returns in panel A,
equally-weighted portfolio excess returns in panel B, results of regressing monthly value-weighted
portfolio excess returns on a constant and market excess return in panel C and results of regressing
monthly value-weighted portfolio returns on a constant, market excess return, and the size (SMB)
and value (HML) factors of Fama and French (1993) in panel D. Newey and West (1987) standard
errors are reported in parentheses. Stocks are assigned to one of five portfolios based on their
exposure to the KML portfolio, βKML, is estimated from rolling regressions of stock’s monthly
excess return on a constant and monthly return of the KML portfolio over the last 60 months.
Portfolios are rebalanced annually at the end of June. The average excess returns and standard
errors in panel A and B are annualized averages of monthly excess returns. The alpha estimates
and their standard errors in panel C and D are annualized. The sample period is from 1975 to
2015. *** Significant at the 1 percent level. ** Significant at the 5 percent level. * Significant at
the 10 percent level.
Low βKML 2 3 4 High βKML
High-Low
βKML
Panel A. Value-weighted portfolio excess return
Excess return 12.45*** 11.54*** 10.03*** 7.45*** 5.6** -6.85***
(3.2) (2.76) (2.66) (2.65) (2.65) (2.14)
Panel B. Equally-weighted portfolio excess return
Excess return 12.95*** 12.57*** 11.1*** 10.45*** 8.66*** -4.29**
(3.48) (3.16) (2.96) (2.94) (3.24) (1.7)
Panel C. CAPM
Alpha 2.966* 2.985** 2.028** -0.79 -2.423** -5.389**
(1.745) (1.419) (0.96) (0.817) (1.188) (2.475)
Market 1.16*** 1.047*** 0.979*** 1.009*** 0.981*** -0.179*
(0.06) (0.044) (0.036) (0.017) (0.054) (0.104)
R2 78.48% 85.02% 86.28% 90.22% 80.17% 3.56%
Panel D. Three-factor model of Fama and French (1993)
Alpha 2.263 2.304** 1.737* -0.42 -1.385 -3.648*
(1.584) (1.015) (0.968) (0.791) (0.942) (1.989)
Market 1.11*** 1.036*** 0.989*** 1.014*** 0.974*** -0.137
(0.054) (0.035) (0.034) (0.015) (0.046) (0.084)
SMB 0.312*** 0.144*** -0.001 -0.075** -0.106** -0.419***
(0.108) (0.04) (0.041) (0.031) (0.046) (0.123)
HML -0.001 0.068 0.056 -0.038 -0.152** -0.151
(0.116) (0.075) (0.052) (0.039) (0.074) (0.168)
R2 80.82% 85.79% 86.39% 90.46% 81.27% 12.35%
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Table VII
Panel Regressions of Annual Stock Returns on βKML and Firm Characteristics
This table reports the results of regressing annual stock returns on a constant, βKML, other stocks
characteristics and year fixed effect as indicated. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level
and reported in parentheses. βKML is estimated from rolling regressions of stock’s monthly excess
return on a constant and monthly return of the KML portfolio over the last 60 months. BM is the
book-to-market equity ratio, βmarket is the regression coefficient of market excess return from rolling
time-series regression of firm excess return onto market excess return and a constant, CF denotes
cash flow, Lev denotes financial leverage, PCM denotes the price-to-cost margin, Profitability is the
ratio of sales minus cost of goods sold, interest expenses, and selling, general, and administrative
expenses to book equity, Size is the natural logarithm of the market capitalization in thousands,
and Turnover is the fraction of shares traded to the total shares outstanding. The sample period
is from 1975 to 2015. *** Significant at the 1 percent level. ** Significant at the 5 percent level. *
Significant at the 10 percent level.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)
βKML -3.829∗∗∗ -1.599∗∗∗ -1.531∗∗∗ -2.032∗∗∗ -1.544∗∗∗ -1.690∗∗∗ -1.653∗∗∗ -1.444∗∗∗ -1.902∗∗∗ -1.558∗∗∗ -2.106∗∗∗
(0.249) (0.296) (0.307) (0.297) (0.292) (0.297) (0.297) (0.324) (0.299) (0.295) (0.333)
BM 1.207∗∗∗ 2.005∗∗∗
(0.314) (0.393)
Beta -4.728∗∗∗ -2.649∗∗∗
(0.331) (0.399)
CF 18.39∗∗∗ 11.01∗∗
(3.563) (4.736)
Lev -4.471∗∗∗ -4.495∗∗∗
(0.881) (1.032)
PCM 3.279∗∗∗ 4.033∗∗∗
(1.099) (1.244)
Profitability 0.397∗∗ 0.360∗∗
(0.162) (0.148)
Size 0.799∗∗∗ 0.909∗∗∗
(0.118) (0.139)
Turnover -29.38∗∗∗ -23.80∗∗∗
(2.320) (2.576)
Year fixed effect No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 57959 57959 54810 57959 57906 57769 57958 49348 57959 57959 49234
R2 0.00528 0.154 0.154 0.158 0.156 0.155 0.154 0.157 0.155 0.159 0.166
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Table VIII
Mean Portfolio Returns for Conditionally Double-Sorted Portfolios
This table reports the average excess returns for conditionally double-sorted portfolios. In the first
step, I sort stocks into three baskets based on the control variable indicated in each column. In
the second step, I sort stocks within each of these three baskets into three additional baskets based
on βKML resulting in nine portfolios in total. I then create three portfolios by pooling the stocks
in the βKML-based baskets with the same rank. I report the annualized average value-weighted
returns for portfolios with conditionally low-, medium-, and high-βKML stocks as well as for the
High-Low βKML portfolio. Newey and West (1987) standard errors are in parentheses. βKML
is estimated from rolling regressions of stock’s monthly excess return on a constant and monthly
return of the KML portfolio over the last 60 months. BM is the book-to-market equity ratio,
βmarket is the regression coefficient of market excess return from rolling time-series regression of
firm excess return onto market excess return and a constant, CF denotes cash flow, Lev denotes
financial leverage, PCM denotes the price-to-cost margin, Profitability is the ratio of sales minus
cost of goods sold, interest expenses, and selling, general, and administrative expenses to book
equity, Size is the natural logarithm of the market capitalization in thousands, and Turnover is the
fraction of shares traded to the total shares outstanding. The first column shows average excess
return for unconditional sorting based on βKML. The last column reports average excess return
for sorting on BM conditional on Size. The sample period is from 1975 to 2015. *** Significant at
the 1 percent level. ** Significant at the 5 percent level. * Significant at the 10 percent level.
Uncond BM βmarket CF Lev PCM Profitability Size Turnover
BM
cond
Size
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Low βKML 12.72 10.83 10.53 10.68 10.41 11.02 10.78 9.64 10.24 6.2
2 9.56 7.42 7.26 7.99 8.38 7.84 8.43 7.7 8.39 7.33
High βKML 6.12 5.6 5.94 5.44 5.42 5.66 5.35 5.43 5.53 8.35
High-Low βKML -6.6*** -5.23*** -4.59*** -5.24*** -5.0*** -5.36*** -5.43*** -4.21*** -4.7*** 2.15
(1.83) (1.51) (1.55) (1.64) (1.55) (1.64) (1.61) (1.59) (1.56) (1.81)
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Table IX
Long-Horizon Predictability of the Return Premium
This table reports the results of forecasting regressions of the y-year cumulative annual log return
premium of the Low-High βKML portfolio on the I-shock measure in panel A. Panel B shows the
results of forecasting regressions that include also the aggregate economic growth (GDP), a proxy
for the consumption-wealth ratio (cay) of Lettau and Ludvigson (2001), and the price-earnings
ratio (CAPE P/E10) of Campbell and Shiller (1988). The horizon of the cumulative log return
is indicated in columns. Low-High βKML portfolio consists of a long position in stocks with low
βKML and a short position in stocks with high βKML. The portfolio is rebalanced annually at the
end of June. The portfolio returns are value-weighted. Newey and West (1987) standard errors are
reported in parentheses and Hansen and Hodrick (1980) standard errors in brackets. The sample
period is from 1970 to 2015. *** Significant at the 1 percent level. ** Significant at the 5 percent
level. * Significant at the 10 percent level. Source: The data for aggregate economic growth:
U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis; the proxy for the consumption-wealth ratio: Martin Lettau’s
website; the price-earnings ratio: Robert Shiller’s website.
1-1 1-2 1-3 1-4 1-5
Panel A. Predicting the Low-High βKML portfolio returns by I-shock
Constant 0.05 0.056 0.119 0.216 0.319
(0.041) (0.084) (0.104) (0.11)* (0.116)***
[0.041] [0.091] [0.113] [0.117]* [0.107]***
Ishock 0.722 2.413 2.731 2.474 2.058
(0.738) (1.334)* (1.599)* (1.574) (1.6)
[0.586] [1.199]* [1.526]* [1.374]* [1.232]
R2 2.5% 13.9% 13.42% 8.54% 5.35%
Panel B. Predicting the Low-High βKML portfolio returns by I-shock and
additional predictors
Constant 0.12 0.132 0.128 0.172 0.247
(0.062)* (0.114) (0.152) (0.171) (0.191)
[0.063]* [0.132] [0.175] [0.182] [0.189]
Ishock 1.327 3.062 2.822 2.151 1.544
(0.924) (1.5)** (1.615)* (1.501) (1.45)
[0.834] [1.307]** [1.289]** [0.769]*** [0.98]
GDP -2.453 -1.584 -0.068 2.022 2.95
(1.257)* (1.5) (1.528) (1.897) (1.72)*
[1.302]* [1.455] [1.332] [1.223] [1.379]**
cay 0.647 0.594 -0.384 -1.955 -3.365
(1.141) (2.013) (2.281) (2.056) (2.035)
[1.18] [2.007] [1.874] [1.254] [1.569]**
CAPE P/E10 -0.001 -0.003 0 0 0.001
(0.003) (0.004) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007)
[0.002] [0.004] [0.007] [0.007] [0.008]
R2 14.88% 17.9% 13.56% 12.26% 13.84%
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Table X
Firms’ One-Year Response to Technological Shocks
This table reports the results of regressing firm-level percentage changes in employment, capital and
capital-labor ratio in panel A, and sales, percentage point changes in return on capital and return
on equity in Panel B, between years t and t+ 1 on the I-shock measure in year t, Ishockt, firm i
′s
exposure to technology shock in year t measured by the deciles’ index, Iβ
KML
i,t , of cross-sectionally
ranked βKMLi,t , and their interaction term, Ishockt×Iβ
KML
i,t . The regressions include aggregate TFP
shock, TFPt, and deterministic trend, Trendt, as aggregate control variables and firm i
′s capital,
Ki,t, age, Agei,t, market capitalization, Sizei,t, lagged dependent variable for one-year horizon
t − 1 to t, and firm fixed effects as firm-specific control variables. Columns βKML ≤ median and
βKML > median show results of the regressions without the interaction term estimated for firms
with below and above median βKML, respectively. Standard errors are clustered at SIC 4 digit
industry level and reported in parentheses. The sample period is from 1975 to 2015. *** Significant
at the 1 percent level. ** Significant at the 5 percent level. * Significant at the 10 percent level.
Panel A. Changes in employment, capital and capital-labor ratio
Employment Capital Capital-labor ratio
Full
sample
βKML ≤
median
βKML >
median
Full
sample
βKML ≤
median
βKML >
median
Full
sample
βKML ≤
median
βKML >
median
Ishockt -0.830
∗∗∗ -0.560∗∗∗ 0.008 1.038∗∗∗ 1.138∗∗∗ 1.100∗∗∗ 2.047∗∗∗ 1.837∗∗∗ 1.174∗∗∗
(0.185) (0.146) (0.106) (0.135) (0.103) (0.110) (0.170) (0.141) (0.130)
Iβ
KML
i,t -0.039 0.080 0.032 -0.080
∗ -0.011 -0.130 -0.063 -0.204∗∗ -0.209∗∗
(0.043) (0.102) (0.092) (0.043) (0.092) (0.106) (0.039) (0.094) (0.101)
Ishockt × Iβ
KML
i,t 0.102
∗∗∗ 0.002 -0.110∗∗∗
(0.031) (0.027) (0.029)
TFPt 1.229
∗∗∗ 1.442∗∗∗ 1.070∗∗∗ 0.392∗∗∗ 0.652∗∗∗ 0.009 -1.160∗∗∗ -1.155∗∗∗ -1.307∗∗∗
(0.097) (0.146) (0.131) (0.082) (0.112) (0.107) (0.097) (0.130) (0.151)
Ki,t -4.999
∗∗∗ -5.087∗∗∗ -5.299∗∗∗ -4.927∗∗∗ -4.993∗∗∗ -5.370∗∗∗ 0.446∗∗ 0.598∗∗ 0.086
(0.223) (0.342) (0.333) (0.218) (0.324) (0.352) (0.224) (0.297) (0.347)
Agei,t 0.025 -0.141 0.168 0.107 0.281
∗ 0.065 0.029 0.258∗∗ -0.118
(0.085) (0.137) (0.190) (0.071) (0.148) (0.220) (0.065) (0.110) (0.104)
Sizei,t 0.028
∗∗∗ 0.049 0.023∗∗ 0.035∗∗∗ 0.064 0.031∗∗∗ 0.016∗∗∗ 0.021 0.016∗∗∗
(0.010) (0.033) (0.010) (0.010) (0.039) (0.010) (0.005) (0.015) (0.006)
Trend 0.078 0.199 -0.006 -0.164∗∗ -0.374∗∗ -0.079 -0.287∗∗∗ -0.519∗∗∗ -0.122
(0.086) (0.137) (0.193) (0.074) (0.145) (0.225) (0.067) (0.108) (0.111)
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 44109 22515 21607 44109 22515 21607 44109 22515 21607
R2 0.234 0.309 0.285 0.311 0.397 0.337 0.147 0.217 0.211
Panel B. Changes in sales, return on capital, and return on equity
Sales Return on capital Return on equity
Full
sample
βKML ≤
median
βKML >
median
Full
sample
βKML ≤
median
βKML >
median
Full
sample
βKML ≤
median
βKML >
median
Ishockt -1.420
∗∗∗ -1.364∗∗∗ -0.591∗∗∗ -0.872∗∗∗ -0.786∗∗∗ -0.515∗∗∗ -1.767∗∗∗ -1.509∗∗∗ -0.816∗∗∗
(0.275) (0.237) (0.179) (0.086) (0.071) (0.109) (0.194) (0.157) (0.202)
Iβ
KML
i,t -0.131
∗∗ 0.083 -0.210 -0.004 0.024 -0.003 0.005 0.102 -0.037
(0.051) (0.104) (0.148) (0.017) (0.035) (0.051) (0.036) (0.090) (0.097)
Ishockt × Iβ
KML
i,t 0.073 0.046
∗∗∗ 0.128∗∗∗
(0.047) (0.016) (0.035)
TFPt 2.084
∗∗∗ 2.182∗∗∗ 1.862∗∗∗ 0.466∗∗∗ 0.437∗∗∗ 0.447∗∗∗ 0.783∗∗∗ 0.761∗∗∗ 0.681∗∗∗
(0.171) (0.204) (0.202) (0.059) (0.058) (0.102) (0.114) (0.136) (0.182)
Ki,t -4.426
∗∗∗ -4.310∗∗∗ -4.684∗∗∗ -1.659∗∗∗ -1.815∗∗∗ -1.781∗∗∗ -2.796∗∗∗ -2.944∗∗∗ -3.058∗∗∗
(0.236) (0.339) (0.407) (0.091) (0.133) (0.139) (0.208) (0.312) (0.338)
Agei,t 0.002 -0.100 0.103 0.026 0.028 0.010 0.058 0.025 0.131
(0.077) (0.151) (0.149) (0.028) (0.044) (0.026) (0.069) (0.114) (0.118)
Sizei,t 0.019
∗ 0.049 0.015 -0.009∗∗∗ -0.004 -0.011∗∗∗ -0.016∗∗∗ -0.023 -0.019∗∗∗
(0.011) (0.034) (0.011) (0.003) (0.005) (0.004) (0.006) (0.018) (0.007)
Trend -0.031 0.037 -0.114 0.100∗∗∗ 0.120∗∗∗ 0.116∗∗∗ 0.145∗∗ 0.205∗ 0.086
(0.076) (0.151) (0.151) (0.029) (0.044) (0.029) (0.071) (0.115) (0.122)
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 44109 22515 21607 44044 22476 21581 40760 20714 20057
R2 0.237 0.342 0.257 0.168 0.252 0.215 0.183 0.258 0.242
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Table XI
Firms’ Three-Years Response to Technological Shocks, Highly Competitive
versus Less Competitive Industries
This table reports the results of regressing firm-level percentage changes in employment and capital
in panel A, capital-labor ratio and sales in panel B, and percentage point changes in return on
capital and return on equity in Panel C, between years t and t + 3 on the I-shock measure in
year t, Ishockt, and firm i
′s exposure to technology shock in year t measured by the deciles index,
Iβ
KML
i,t , of cross-sectionally ranked β
KML
i,t . The regressions include aggregate TFP shock, TFPt,
and deterministic trend, Trendt, as aggregate control variables and firm i
′s capital, Ki,t, age, Agei,t,
market capitalization, Sizei,t, lagged dependent variable for one-year horizon t − 1 to t, and firm
fixed effects as firm-specific control variables. The regressions are estimated for firms with below
and above median βKML in industries with high and low competition as indicated. Industries with
high and low competition are industries with above and below average Herfindahl-Hirschman index
of sales at the SIC 3 digit industry level. Standard errors are clustered at SIC 4 digit industry
level and reported in parentheses. The sample period is from 1975 to 2015. *** Significant at the
1 percent level. ** Significant at the 5 percent level. * Significant at the 10 percent level.
Panel A. Changes in employment and capital
Employment Capital
High competition Low competition High competition Low competition
βKML ≤
median
βKML >
median
βKML ≤
median
βKML >
median
βKML ≤
median
βKML >
median
βKML ≤
median
βKML >
median
Ishockt -2.810
∗∗∗ -1.730∗∗∗ -2.595∗∗∗ -2.196∗∗∗ 0.983∗∗ 1.281∗∗∗ 0.841∗∗∗ 0.538∗
(0.454) (0.383) (0.333) (0.297) (0.398) (0.380) (0.315) (0.283)
Iβ
KML
i,t -0.409 0.203 0.202 0.183 -0.590
∗ -0.018 0.184 -0.239
(0.346) (0.261) (0.318) (0.327) (0.329) (0.397) (0.305) (0.337)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 8139 9785 11672 9647 8135 9782 11667 9646
R2 0.593 0.544 0.547 0.548 0.648 0.557 0.600 0.551
Panel B. Changes in capital-labor ratio and sales
Capital-labor ratio Sales
High competition Low competition High competition Low competition
βKML ≤
median
βKML >
median
βKML ≤
median
βKML >
median
βKML ≤
median
βKML >
median
βKML ≤
median
βKML >
median
Ishockt 4.210
∗∗∗ 3.398∗∗∗ 3.693∗∗∗ 2.711∗∗∗ -3.410∗∗∗ -2.800∗∗∗ -3.039∗∗∗ -2.743∗∗∗
(0.557) (0.360) (0.327) (0.349) (0.642) (0.565) (0.428) (0.365)
Iβ
KML
i,t -0.175 -0.241 -0.161 -0.531
∗ -0.531 -0.558 -0.192 -0.283
(0.344) (0.338) (0.296) (0.319) (0.414) (0.534) (0.333) (0.374)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 8135 9782 11667 9646 8138 9782 11671 9644
R2 0.463 0.446 0.422 0.433 0.586 0.488 0.548 0.542
Panel C. Changes in return on capital and return on equity
Return on capital Return on equity
High competition Low competition High competition Low competition
βKML ≤
median
βKML >
median
βKML ≤
median
βKML >
median
βKML ≤
median
βKML >
median
βKML ≤
median
βKML >
median
Ishockt -1.289
∗∗∗ -1.016∗∗∗ -0.932∗∗∗ -0.541∗∗∗ -2.431∗∗∗ -1.911∗∗∗ -1.842∗∗∗ -0.797∗∗∗
(0.141) (0.249) (0.102) (0.093) (0.319) (0.448) (0.265) (0.226)
Iβ
KML
i,t -0.233
∗∗ 0.052 -0.058 0.043 -0.330 0.130 -0.005 -0.134
(0.112) (0.134) (0.080) (0.110) (0.273) (0.275) (0.215) (0.264)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 8136 9777 11650 9634 7373 8865 10417 8731
R2 0.436 0.384 0.369 0.405 0.447 0.414 0.368 0.445
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